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ABSTRACT 
Title: Is a Universal Income Grant an appropriate social policy to alleviate poverty in 
Rwanda? 
John HAGUMA 
Degree:  M. Com (Structured) 
 
Rwanda is characterised as a low-income country amongst the poorest on the African continent. 
Poverty in Rwanda has been persistent for a long period of time and it was made worse by the 
genocide that took place in 1994 and claimed over a million people. Although a variety of social 
policies, both home-grown and foreign, have been adopted since 1994 by the government of 
Rwanda to try and alleviate poverty, none has up to now succeeded to get rid of the poverty-
conflict trap, partly because they are all means tested. It should be noted here that Rwanda’s 
situation needs a universal approach in order to help ameliorate the current poverty level which 
is now at 60 percent, and the rising inequality. The researcher, when investigating a universal 
approach to use, suggested that a UIG could be the appropriate social policy option for Rwanda. 
 
Rwanda has set itself goals through its Vision 2020 and the EDPRS to have changed the 
country’s position by the year 2020 from being categorised as a low-income country into a 
middle-income country like South Africa. However, for this to be possible, economic growth 
must be robust.  An annual growth rate of 7 percent needs to be maintained. It also means that 
the current per capita annual income of $290 needs to be increased to $900. The researcher 
concurs with these developmental goals but at the same time cautions policy makers that 
although growth is necessary, it should not crowd out redistributive justice.  
 
There seems to be a strong argument that development approaches which focus on income 
transfers are more prudent in attaining economic development and poverty reduction than those 
whose sole intention is to attain economic growth. Although policies that pursue economic 
growth usually lead to inequalities in the societies, governments should take it upon themselves 
to ensure that there are also counter measures that will reduce poverty at the same time.  
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The researcher in this dissertation advocates for a universal income grant financed by an increase 
in indirect taxes supplemented by foreign aid as the best approach towards poverty alleviation in 
Rwanda. It must be noted that dependency on foreign aid is not sustainable in the long-term. 
There is a need to come up with measures of utilizing the already existing foreign aid in 
alleviating poverty and also to take care of future uncertainties when the foreign aid has been 
stopped. 
 
In order for Rwanda to break out of the poverty–conflict trap, it needs to adopt social policies 
that are geared towards alleviating poverty and assuring growth.  A UIG was chosen as a social 
policy option that is capable of alleviating poverty.  
 
This research had three major aims. First of all it shows the possible impact of a universal 
income grant (UIG) in as far as the alleviation of poverty in Rwanda is concerned. Secondly it 
considers how a part of the existing foreign aid could be channelled into a UIG for all, with the 
funding effectively being recouped from those who do need support by an increase in the indirect 
taxes, e.g. in VAT. Thirdly develops a micro-simulation model which could show the impact of 
the combination of a UIG, partly being financed out of foreign aid and partly by the increases in 
indirect taxes, on poverty and income distribution in Rwanda. It is clear from the analysis that if 
the UIG is introduced in Rwanda it will have a multiplier effect when it develops social capital, 
stimulate aggregate spending, increase economic activity, bring investor confidence, promote 
economic growth and job creation and in the end alleviate poverty. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Which social policies are both suited for the facilitation of a 
higher economic growth and a positive impact on social 
development? Do the contingency of globalisation, to which all 
countries are today exposed, permit the luxury of developing a 
home grown social policy? Or is it more sensible to simply 
accept the social policy approaches recommended so strongly 
by the international organisations such as the World Bank and 
the IMF? Le Roux (2004:1). 
 
This dissertation is trying to identify an appropriate social policy that Rwanda could use in 
order to alleviate poverty. As Le Roux implies, in the paper he wrote for the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and the African Union in January 20041 quoted above, it is clear 
that Rwanda needs to pursue both the appropriate social policy and economic growth. But are 
the current social policies really favouring the attainment of a high rate of economic growth? 
And if so, do they facilitate social development?   
 
Rwanda like all other countries has been influenced by globalisation. The question is whether 
in this context it is possible for Rwanda to develop a home grown social policy? Or must it 
simply accept the social policies dictated to them by organisations such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? 
 
1.1 . Background 
Poverty is among the many issues that have been investigated by research in development 
studies. In terms of poverty Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 90 
percent of its population in rural areas.2. Out of 175 countries for which estimates have been 
made in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), it is ranked 158th. In terms of per 
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP US $), Rwanda is 
ranked 153rd out of 175 countries.3  Poverty in Rwanda has been persistent for a long period.4 
Although a variety of social policies have been put in place to try and alleviate poverty in 
                                                
1
 The Title of the paper is: A South African Social Policy Framework Analyzing and understanding the past and 
planning for the future. 
2
 United Nations (2006:7); 
3
 Howe & Mckay (2007:200) 
4
 Majyambere & Nzaramba (2006) also see http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id_article=1579 
(Accessed  .on 20/06/2007);Musahara (2004). 
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Rwanda, none has up to now succeeded to get rid of the poverty-conflict trap.5 This suggests 
that new approaches towards poverty alleviation are required. President Kagame said at the 
launch of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) that: 
‘Rwandans need to be liberated from poverty and I wish it could be changed to poverty 
liberation instead of poverty reduction’. 6 This would indicate that there is the political will to 
alleviate poverty.  
 
Rwanda is characterised as a low-income country. But this has not stopped it from setting 
itself ambitious goals through its Vision 2020 according to which it wishes to transform the 
economy from a low-income into a middle-income country by the year 2020.7  What this 
means is that it wants to move from the present per capita income of 290 US Dollars per year 
to 900 US Dollars. This will require an annual growth rate of 7%.8 Rwanda has already 
shown itself to be able to restore and reform the economy by establishing a stable 
government and securing peace and safety in its territory.9  
 
Economic growth is necessary10 to address issues of inequalities and unemployment but it is 
not a sufficient condition for poverty reduction.11  Growth need not crowd out distributive 
justice because this is how its impact on the poor will be identified across the population.12  It 
should be noted however that if a country’s citizens are illiterate, unskilled, politically angry 
and unsupported by their governments in their endeavour to make a living, then there is a 
growing risk that the goal to attain economic growth will be rejected by many.13 This is a 
topical issue today especially since some countries have attained the growth but their 
populations are still suffering from chronic poverty.14 This is because growth has failed to 
trickledown to the poor. 
                                                
5
 Musahara( 2004:231). 
6
 Howe & Mckay (2007:200). 
7
 RIEPA (2006); RPSF (2005:2). 
8
 Republic of Rwanda (2000:6). 
9
 United Nations (2006:1). 
10
 Bhorat Haroon &Ravi Kanbur (2006:9); Dollar, D. & Kraay, A. (2002); Kannbur, R. (2005); Ravallion, M. & 
Chen, S. (2003); May (2000). 
 
11
 Coady, D. et la.,(2004:1); World Bank (2004:1); World Bank (2002) ; Cabazas & Rob (2006:54)  
and Easterly (2002:8). 
12
 Musahara( 2004:231); Yanagizawa & Bigsten (2006:8) ;Cabazas & Rob (2006:54) and May (2000:11-13). 
13
 Nolan Riall (2002:11). 
14
 This is exactly what Prof. Le Roux was referring to in the quotation above. He was referring to South Africa 
which had attained the growth but had at the same time failed to deal with poverty, unemployment and 
inequality. 
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 It is for this reason, that Goldin & Reinert have argued that:  
The acceleration of growth and poverty reduction requires a 
more rapid evolution and dissemination of ideas. The challenge 
is the identification and assimilation of what works (and what 
does not work) in the fight against poverty, with local ideas 
addressing the uniqueness of local problems drawing on the full 
richness of global knowledge.15 
 
There seems to be a strongly argued view that development approaches which focus on 
income transfers are more prudent in attaining economic development and poverty reduction 
than those whose sole intention is to attain economic growth.16 Because policies that pursue 
economic growth usually lead to inequalities in the societies, governments should take it 
upon themselves to ensure that there are also counter measures that will reduce poverty at the 
same time. It means therefore that they should focus growth in areas that have a high benefit 
for the poor.17  
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem  
Today proponents of development advocate for poverty alleviation in a number of ways. 
Some concentrate on getting rid of income poverty, others are more preoccupied with 
reducing the illiteracy rate and getting the rural poor out of their poor health conditions, while 
others focus on those with insecurity of income to be provided them with a remedy, and 
advocate for those who are powerless.18  A universal income grant (UIG) partly financed 
from foreign aid, has, however, not been investigated in any detail before.  In this dissertation 
the possibility of combining a UIG and foreign aid as the best approach towards poverty 
alleviation in Rwanda is investigated. 
 
Social welfare transfers from the rich to the destitute members of society are a common trend 
whenever countries are faced continuously with high levels of inequality, unemployment and 
poverty.19 It should be noted however that because development theorists and policy makers 
already have different ideological thinking and they come from a wide variety of schools of 
                                                
15
 Goldin & Reinert (2007:194). 
16
 Taylor, V. (2007); Rhee (2007); Le Roux (2002); McKay (2004); Musahara (2004). 
17
 Taylor, V (2007:19). 
18
 Goldin & Reinert ( 2007:124) 
19
 Musahara (2004); Le Roux (2002). 
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thought, this has led to some social safety nets being referred to as superior and effective over 
the others which have been assumed to be poorer performers.20 
 
In order for Rwanda to break out of the poverty–conflict trap21, it needs to adopt social 
policies that are geared towards alleviating poverty and assuring growth.  In this dissertation 
the researcher will consider whether a universal income grant (UIG) 22 is an appropriate 
social policy option that could enable Rwanda deal with its poverty and also enable it to 
attain its vision 2020.  
 
Despite the fact that Rwanda has been relying on foreign aid for long it has not yet gotten rid 
of the poverty trap. This therefore begs the need to consider how a part of the existing foreign 
aid (say about 20%) could be channelled into a universal income grant for all, with the 
funding effectively being recouped from the better off, and further funding for the grant 
raised for those who do need support by an increase in the indirect taxes, for example in 
VAT23. 
 
1.3. Aims of the Research 
The aims of this research are three fold. First of all the research will try to show the possible 
impact of a universal income grant (UIG) in as far as alleviation of poverty in Rwanda is 
concerned. Secondly it will consider how a part of the existing foreign aid can be channelled 
into a universal income grant for all, with the funding effectively being recouped from those 
who do need support by an increase in the indirect taxes, e.g. in VAT. And thirdly it will 
develop a micro-simulation model which will show the impact of the combination of a 
universal income grant, partly being financed out of foreign aid and partly by the increases in 
indirect taxes, on poverty and income distribution in Rwanda.  
 
                                                
20
 Adesina (2006); Mkandawire (2006); Mkandawire (2001);Midgley (2004). 
21
 Musahara (2004:5). 
22
 Le Roux (2003). 
23
 VAT is a consumption tax, an indirect tax and a multi-stage tax. It was introduced in France by a French 
economist in 1954 known as Maurice Lauré  and it extended over time to all business and reached Africa 
through the countries that were colonized by France such as Ivory Coast in 1959, Senegal in 1960, and 
Madagascar in 1969. Today this tax operates in many parts of Africa like Kenya in 1990, Uganda in 1996, 
Tanzania in 1998, Cameroon in 1998, South Africa in 1998 and in Rwanda it was introduced in January 2001 
(See www.wikipedia.org and www.rra.gov.rw ). 
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1.4. Relevance and filling the gap 
The research is taking place in the context where the existing social policies in Rwanda have 
failed to eliminate poverty. To consider the problem of addressing poverty through changes 
in social policy is clearly relevant in this context.    The research is unique because it is 
advocating for a UIG to be introduced in Rwanda which is a low –income country. It agrees 
with the Goldin & Reinert argument in favour of the ‘evolution and dissemination of ideas’ in 
order to deal with poverty. But they go on to warn us that, ‘the challenge is the identification 
and assimilation of what works and what does not work’. 24  In a search for an appropriate 
social policy option that could deal with poverty in Rwanda, this research has introduced a 
UIG to be given to the entire population as the best idea and the most appropriate social 
policy to alleviate poverty in Rwanda. 
 
1.5. Limitations and research gaps 
The researcher faced some problems in gaining access to government documents and 
statistics.  
 
1.6. Organization of the Thesis 
The dissertation is organised as follows: Chapter two gives an overview of Social policy on 
Poverty in Rwanda. It identifies different social policies that Rwanda has been using to 
alleviate poverty. It shows the gap that exists and hence a need for a Universal Income Grant 
(UIG) as an appropriate social policy.  Chapter three presents a literature review with regard 
to the origins and evolution of the Universal Income Grant (UIG) especially in Developed 
Countries. It then looks at how the Universal Income Grant (UIG) has been interpreted in 
developing countries, but especially middle-income countries such as South Africa, Namibia 
and Brazil. Furthermore it tries to identify some low-income countries that have used income-
transfers as a form of helping its citizens, like Mozambique. Then it introduces the trend of 
foreign aid in Rwanda in order to show why there is a need to channel it directly to poverty 
alleviation. Based on the above this dissertation introduces a U I G in Rwanda even though it 
is a low-income country. But with its ambitious Vision 2020, Rwanda wants to be 
transformed into a middle-income country by 2020. But above all, the inclusion of foreign aid 
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will make a new contribution to the original model developed by le Roux25 for South Africa 
and Namibia, and first applied to Rwanda by Musahara.26  Chapter Four constructs a model 
to measure the impact of a universal income grant financed out of indirect taxes and foreign 
aid on Rwanda. It shows what the impact of UIG will be and investigates whether and at what 
level a UIG can be financed out of the available resources. Chapter five contains the 
Conclusion and Recommendations. 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
 
Rwanda has been affected by globalisation like many other countries. It is at the cross-roads 
in identifying a social policy option to follow. Whether it is possible to adopt a local idea that 
could address the uniqueness of the country will depend on big players like the World Bank 
and IMF. 
 
Rwanda in its pursuit to attain its vision 2020 and the MDGs have focused all its resources on 
attaining economic growth. But as it has been mentioned by many scholars that economic 
growth without distributive justice is not good, there is a need therefore to come up with 
radical ideas that could fill the gap that exists. 
 
The researcher in the chapters that follow suggests the introduction of a UIG as an 
appropriate social policy that may deal with poverty in Rwanda. The idea is particularly 
appropriate for Rwanda because genocide destroyed its social, political and economic 
fabric27.  One needs something akin to the Marshal Plan to achieve economic growth and at 
the same time alleviate poverty. 
 
The research develops a micro-simulation model which shows the impact of the combination 
of a UIG, partly being financed out of foreign aid and partly by the increases in indirect taxes, 
VAT and other indirect taxes (alcohol, cigarettes etc.), on poverty and income distribution in 
Rwanda.  
 
                                                
25
 Le Roux(2002). 
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 Musahara(2004). 
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 Rusuhuzwa (2008:2); Musahara (2004: 149, 213) 
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Chapter Two: Overview of social policy on poverty in Rwanda 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
There is a contradiction between rhetoric and practice in as far as appropriate social policies 
to deal with poverty alleviation are concerned. This chapter gives an overview of social 
policy on poverty in Rwanda by identifying the different social policies that Rwanda has been 
using to try and alleviate poverty. It shows the gap that exists and hence a need for a UIG as 
an appropriate social policy option.   
 
2.2. Poverty in Rwanda 
 The subject of inequality and poverty has engaged the attention of scholars for centuries and 
a wide variety of definitions have been provided. In general, most sources differentiate 
between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ poverty.28  Absolute poverty refers to the lack of sufficient 
income in cash or exchange in items for meeting the most basic needs of food, clothing and 
shelter.29  On the other hand, relative poverty defines poverty of a particular group or area in 
relation to the economic status of other members of the society. From this perspective, people 
are considered as poor if they fall below the prevailing standards of living in a given societal 
context.30               
 
Although extreme poverty according to the World Bank is defined as living on one dollar or 
less per day31, it should be noted that poverty is in fact concerned with the broad dimension 
of all the facets of economic, political, cultural, emotional, and the psychological ones. It 
should be noted however, that eing poor does not simply mean lack of money. No, it also 
means that these poor people are subjected to physical abuse and violence, humiliation and 
indignity, and above all exploitation by the powerful and the wealth.32 “It normally involves 
experiences of humiliation, of helplessness, of ill health, of indignity, of anxiety, of rejection 
                                                
28
 Sachs (2005); Graaff (2003); World Bank (2000); World Bank (1998); Atkinson (1991); Bigstein (1983). 
29
 Sachs (2005); Atkinson (1991); World Bank (2000);World Bank (1990). 
30
 Sachs ( 2005); World Bank (2000); World Bank(1998); Atkinson( 1991); Bigstein( 1983) 
31
 Nolan (2002:30).  
32
 May (2000:11-13); Graaff (2003:6).  
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and denigration, of powerlessness and insecurity, of fatalism, of being trapped in a terribly 
bleak place, and of deep injustice”.33 
 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was designed during the post-conflict 
environment. Its primary focus was to manage the transitional period of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction which was from 2002-2005.34 This Strategy was very good in as far as 
categorising the poor people was concerned. It enabled policy makers to know which groups 
were in severe poverty. However, it never showed how it will get the categories of 
households that are in destitution (Umutindi nyakujya, Umutindi and umukene) out of 
poverty. Table 1 shows the different categories of persons in Rwanda as categorised by the 
PRSP. 
 
Table 1: Poverty Categories in the Rwanda’s Nationwide Participatory Poverty 
Assessment PPA  
Category of household Characteristics 
Umutindi nyakujya (Those in abject poverty) Those who need to beg to survive. They have no 
land or livestock and lack shelter, adequate clothing 
and food. They fall sick often and have no access to 
medical care. Their children are malnourished and 
they cannot afford to send them to school. 
Umutindi (The very poor) The main difference between the umutindi and 
umutindi nyakujya is that this group is physically 
capable of working on land owned by others, 
although they themselves have either no land or 
very small landholdings, and no livestock. 
Umukene (The poor) These households have some land and housing. 
They live on their own labour and produce, and 
though they have no savings, they can eat, even if 
the food is not very nutritious. However, they do not 
have a surplus to sell in the market, their children do 
not always go to school and they often have no 
access to health care. 
Umukene wifashije (The resourceful poor) This group shares many of the characteristics of the 
umukene but, in addition, they have small ruminants 
and their children go to primary school. 
                                                
33
 Ibid pg.8 
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Umukungu (The food rich) This group has larger landholdings with fertile soil 
and enough to eat. They have livestock, often have 
paid jobs, and can access health care 
Umukire (The money rich) This group has land and livestock, and often has 
salaried jobs. They have good housing, often own a 
vehicle, and have enough money to lend and to get 
credit from the bank. Many migrate to urban 
centres. 
Source: Howe & Mckay (2005:202); Musahara (2004); Republic of Rwanda (2002)  
 
Vision 2020 is a document that was designed after the genocide of 1994 after a broad 
consultation process through meetings that took place at the president’s office, commonly known 
as Village urugwiro. It is a long-term ambitious growth and development document whose 
main priorities are: good governance, rural transformation, manufacturing and service 
development, regional and international cooperation, promotion of the private sector and poverty 
reduction.35 It emphasizes a GDP of $US 14.4 billion, an average GDP growth rate of 7%, and a 
per capita GDP of $US 900 per annum, for most of the next 20 years. Its main targets are: to 
attain universal primary education by 2010, reduce infant mortality rates by two thirds by 2015, 
achieve gender equality by 2020 and to reduce a population growth rate of about 2.9% down to 
about 2% by 2010.36 It is important to note that so far eight years are gone and we are 
remaining with only twelve years to see to it that the goals set in table 2 below are achieved. 
 
However like the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)37, Vision 2020 does not tell us 
how poverty will be eliminated. If you take three indicators from table 2 and 3 and compare 
them you will find that a lot still needs to be done. For example in 2000 the life expectancy 
rate was 49 years, infant mortality rate was 107 for every 1000 live births and poverty was at 
64 percent. Now six years down the road you would expect a drastic change but this is not 
how things are because life expectancy actually reduced to 44 years and yet the expectation is 
                                                
35
 Ansoms (2007); Musahara (2004). 
36
 Musahara (2004:237); Republic of Rwanda (2000). Vision 2020. 
37
 PRSP is an acronym for a poverty reduction strategy. It is like any PRSP in any other developing country with the exception that in 
Rwanda the effects of genocide have substantially influenced it. Its major feature was to develop a nationwide involvement of the people or 
what the government called a participatory poverty assessment (PPA). It aims to generate an accurate profile and diagnosis of what poverty 
is in Rwanda, evaluate the policies proposed in the I-PRSP and be able to State a longer-term process in which poor people would generate 
and implement their own solutions. Its main pillars are economic growth, macroeconomic stability, prioritization of public actions, forging 
a sound partnership between government and other stakeholders and human resource development. The priority areas are agriculture for 
transformation of the rural areas, human resource development, economic infrastructure, good governance, private sector and technology, 
gender, environment, HIV/AIDS, Capacity building, villagisation (Imidugudu) and inequality (Musahara (2004:238-241). 
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that by 2010 it should be at least 50 years. Infant mortality improved to 118 for every 1000 
live births, although the expectation is that it should be 80 for every 1000 live births by 2010. 
The incidence of poverty in 2000 was estimated to be 64 percent while in 2006 it reduced 
slightly to 57 percent but the expectation is that by 2010 poverty should have been reduced to 
40 percent. It is against this background that this thesis tries to put forward the UIG as a 
social policy option that would enable Vision 2020 to achieve its objectives. 
 
Table 2: Major Projections of Vision 2020 
Indicator 
Current situation-
2000 Projection 2010 
Projection 
2020 
Population 8,300,000 11,000,000 14,000,000 
Life expectancy 49 50 55 
Total fertility rate per woman 6.5 5.5 4.5 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 107 80 50 
Maternal mortality( per 10,000 women 1070 600 200 
Rate of demographic growth 2.9 2.3 2.2 
Primary school enrolment rate-Net 72 100 100 
Poverty as a % below 1$ per day 64 40 30 
Average growth of GDP 6.2 8 8 
Source: Musahara (2004:239) 
 
Table 3: Rwanda’s Economic and Social Indicators for 2006 
GDP (US$ Billions) 2.5 
Population, mid-year (Millions) 9.1 
GNI Per  Capita 250 
Poverty (% of Population below national poverty line) 57 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 44 
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live births) 118 
Child Malnutrition (% of children under 5) 23 
Literacy (% of population age 15+ 65 
Access to an improved water source (% of population) 74 
Gross primary enrollment (% of school –age 
population) 
Male 
Female 
120 
 
119 
121 
Source: World Bank (2006); http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/rwa_aag.pdf (Accessed on 15/07/2008); 
              National Institute of Statistics Rwanda. 
 
It is clear that although Rwanda had a well written Poverty Reduction Strategy and the 
ambitious Vision 2020, poverty is still a major problem for Rwanda as can be seen in Table 
4, where poverty is considered by province.  
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Table 4: Proportion of people who are poor by Province (%) 
Province 2000–01 2005–06 
City of Kigali 24 20 
Southern 66 67 
Western 63 62 
Northern 67 63 
Eastern 62 50 
National 60 57 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007:28). Profile of Living Conditions. National Institute of Statistics Rwanda 
 
From Table 4 above, we can see how poverty incidences are similar throughout the five 
provinces. From the statistics shown above in table 4 it is clear that on a national level there 
is a drop in among the poor from 60 percent in 2000-01 to 57 percent in 2005-06. This further 
implies that there has been a real reduction in poverty over the past five years.  Not only did 
poverty drop in Kigali but it also dropped in other areas. It is worth noting that some 
provinces have actually benefited more than others in terms of poverty reduction. For 
example in Eastern Province poverty dropped from 62 percent to 50 percent. While the 
Northern and the city of Kigali provinces have seen some reduction in poverty. But the 
Western and Southern provinces were not as privileged as the other provinces.  
 
Although the proportion of people living below the poverty line fell from 43 % to 36.9 %, 
this did not prevent the increase in the number of those living in extreme poverty to 200, 000 
due to the fast growing population.38  In Rwanda, the predominant poor live in Southern 
province, but most specifically in Gikongoro (79%) and Gitarama (57%).39  
 
Poverty however still remains a rural issue, and this can be explained by the fact that 83 
percent live in the rural areas, and they include 92 percent of all poor people in 2005-06 (refer 
to Fig 1 below ).40 
                                                
38
 Republic of Rwanda (2006:5). 
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 Ibid 
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 Republic of Rwanda (2007:27-28). 
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Figure 1: Proportion of people who are poor (%) 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007:28). Profile of Living Conditions. National Institute of Statistics Rwanda 
 
It should be noted however that although the figures indicate that there has been progress in 
reducing poverty, the population has also grown rapidly since 2000-01. It means therefore 
that though the percentage of the population which is poor has fallen, the total number of 
people living in poverty is estimated to have increased from around 4.8 million in 2000-01 to 
5.4 million in 2005-06.41  
 
It also seems as though poverty levels among the vulnerable groups have been reduced.  
From table 5 below, we see that poverty levels among the female-headed households were 
reduced from 66.3 percent in the EICVI of 2000/01 to 60.2 percent in the EICV2 of 2005/06. 
It is also clear that among the widow-headed households there was a reduction from 67.7 
percent in EICV1 of 2000/01 to 59.9 percent of EICV2 of 2005/06. And above all, the 
poverty levels among the child-headed households reduced from 60.1 percent to 56.9 percent 
in 2005/06 EICV2. All in all, the table shows us that poverty levels of all households actually 
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did go down from 60.4 percent of EICV 1 in 2000/01 to 56.9 percent of EICV 2 in 2005/06. 
But what should be noted about this group is that it represents the vulnerable, those that need 
immediate attention. They are a product of the 1994 genocide. Yes poverty levels dropped, 
but if we adapt the UIG, more of the vulnerable people will get out of destitution because of 
the fact that they will get a monthly grant on a personal basis. 
 
Table 5: Population share and poverty levels among potentially vulnerable households 
(%) 
  EICV 142 EICV 243 
  Population share Poverty level  Population share Poverty level 
Female-
headed 
27.6 66.3 23.8 60.2 
Widow-
headed 
22.0 67.7 18.7 59.9 
Child-headed 1.3 60.1 0.7 56.9 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007:35). Profile of Living Conditions. 
 
There is a big difference between the poor and the wealthy in Rwanda. And there are fears 
that the inequality is growing.  For example, of everything that was consumed in Rwanda, the 
poorest (20%) of the population in 2000/01 consumed only 5% while the wealthiest 20% 
consumed virtually 12 times as much.44  
 
Despite the fact that inequalities exist in Rwanda, Table 6 below shows that there was indeed 
an improvement in some provinces and a decline in others. For example, in the City of Kigali 
Province, poverty among households reduced from 39.9 percent in 2000/01 to 32.1 percent in 
2005/06. The Eastern Province experienced a reduction in poverty among its households 
from 41.5 percent in 2000/01 to 36.1 percent in 2005/06. However, in the Western Province, 
there was a statistically insignificant increase in poverty among households from 40.0 percent 
in 2000/01 to 41.0 percent in 2005/06.  
 
                                                
42
 EICV1 stands for Enquete Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie, 2000/01 or in English referred to as (Integrated 
Living Conditions Survey, 2000/01). 
43
 EICV 2 stands for Enquete Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie, 2000/01 or in English referred to as 
(Integrated Living Conditions Survey, 2005/06). 
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Table 6: Depth of Poverty by Location (% of poverty line) 
 Poverty Depth  
By Stratum EICV 1 EICV2 
Kigali 34.4% 29.3% 
Other Urban 36.0% 37.3% 
Rural 42.1% 40.4% 
By Province   
City of Kigali 39.9% 32.1% 
Southern Province 42.5% 42.7% 
Western Province 40.0% 41.0% 
Northern Province 42.4% 40.1% 
Eastern Province 41.5% 36.1% 
National 41.5% 40.0% 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2006:6).Integrated Living Conditions Survey 2005/2006. 
 
Economists use the Lorenz Curve45 as a measure of income inequality. The gini-coefficient46 
is an outstanding measure of inequality of income distribution. It is always somewhere 
between 0 and 1, with 0.25 being about the lowest ever measured (in some of the 
Scandinavian countries), and 0.68 being the highest recorded up to now (in Namibia).47   
While 0 corresponds to perfect equality, 1 corresponds to perfect inequality. When we have a 
low gini coefficient, it means that there is more equal income or wealth distribution, while 
with a high gini coefficient the implication is that there is more unequal distribution of 
income or wealth.48 
 
                                                
45
 It is a graphical representation that was introduced by Max O. Lorenz in 1905 as a way to represent income 
distribution. 
46
 which was introduced by the Italian Statistician named Corrado Gini in 1912 
47
 Haarmann & Haarmann (2005:19). 
48
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient (Accessed on 05/11/2007) and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_Curve (Accessed on 05/11/2007). 
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2.3. Inequalities in Rwanda 
It is evident from figure 2 and Table 7 below that inequality does exist in Rwanda. The 
Lorenz curve of EICV 1 of 2000/01(blue colour) showed that inequalities were there. And as 
if that was not enough, the EICV2 of 2005/06 (Red colour) also tells us that inequalities in 
Rwanda has increased even though poverty has been reduced to a certain extent.  Table 7 
illustrates the scenario of the levels of inequality by provinces. The City of Kigali province 
had a  gini coefficient of 0.52 in the EICV 1 of 2000/01, while in the EICV 2 of 2005/06, the 
gini coefficient reduced to 0.50. However in the Southern province, the gini coefficient 
increased from 0.39 in 2000/01 to 0.51 in 2005/06 EICV2. Western province in 2000/01 
EICV1 had a gini coefficient of 0.42, but it increased to 0.47 in 2005/06 EICV 2. Northern 
Province had a gini coefficient of 0.42 in 2000/01 EICV1; nevertheless, in 2005/06 EICV2 it 
reduced to 0.41. Eastern province had a gini coefficient of 0.47 in 2000/01 EICV 1 but it 
increased to 0.51 in 2005/06 EICV2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Lorenz Curves for Rwanda 2000/01 and 2005/06 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2006:6).Integrated Living Conditions Survey 2005/2006. 
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It should be noted from the above discussion that inequality does manifest itself clearly in 
Rwanda. Nationally, it increased from a gini coefficient of 0.47 in 2000/01 EICV 1 to a gini 
coefficient of 0.51 in 2005/06 EICV2.  
 
Poverty still persists in Rwanda with 5.4 million Rwandans still living in abject poverty.49 
Will the EDPRS get Rwanda out of poverty? Of course no policy has a universal remedy. But 
it is hoped by the Rwandan Government that with the EDPRS they will be able to attain the 
long-term goals of the Vision 2020 and the MDGs. These policies are, however based on a 
neo-liberal model instead of a pro-poor one which has the ability to get populations out of 
poverty and destitution. It is amazing to see poverty reduction strategies being promoted on 
the international development agenda while in practice little is known about the effective 
policies we can use to reduce poverty.50 There clearly is space for new ideas which address 
the uniqueness of the local problems.51 
Table 7: Consumption growth rates and inequality: 2000/01 to 2005/06 
By Stratum Estimated annualised consumption 
growth rate, 2000/01 to 2005/06 
Gini Coefficient  
  EICV 1 EICV 2 
Kigali 2.1% 0.49 0.47 
Other Urban 1.5% 0.52 0.52 
Rural 3.7% 0.37 0.44 
By Province    
City of Kigali 1.7% 0.52 0.50 
Southern Province 4.3% 0.39 0.51 
Western Province 2.0% 0.42 0.47 
Northern Province 1.2% 0.42 0.41 
Eastern Province 6.1% 0.38 0.43 
National 3.0% 0.47 0.51 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2006:8). Integrated Living Conditions Survey 2005/2006. 
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The EDPRS is the second government strategy after the PRSP in its pursuit to attain the 
country’s long term development aspirations that are embraced in the Vision 2020, the MDGs 
and the Seven Year Government programme.52 It is a medium term framework whose focus 
is to achieve economic growth, poverty reduction and human development. It promotes three 
flagship programs in its quest for human development. They are sustainable growth for jobs 
and exports, Vision 2020 Umurenge which is a decentralised integrated rural development 
program to accelerate reduction in extreme poverty and finally good governance which aims 
to build on Rwanda’s image as a country with a low incidence and tolerance of corruption.53  
The introduction of the EDPRS54 in Rwanda in May 2007 marked a landmark to a new phase 
which they named ‘a development phase’. This differentiates it from the ‘restructuring phase’ 
that begun in 2000. Again like the Vision 2020, the EDPRS has set itself targets which it 
must achieve by 2012. See table 8 below. 
 
Table 8: Targets for the EDPRS in 2012 
Priority area Indicator Baseline 
2006 
Target 
2012  
Growth and poverty reduction Real GDP growth (% annual) 6.5 8.1 
 Export growth (% annual) 10 15 
 National investment (% of GDP) 15 23 
 Share of population living in poverty (%) 57 46 
 Share of population living in extreme poverty (%) 37 24 
 Poverty incidence among people living in female-
headed households (%) 
60 48 
Widen and deepen the financial 
sector 
Private sector credit (% of GDP) 10 12 
 Financial depth (broad money/GDP) 17.5 20 
Develop skills Pupil/teacher ratio in primary schools 70:1 47:1 
 Pupils/classroom in primary schools 70:1 52:1 
 Gross secondary school enrolment 10 30 
Raise agricultural productivity and 
ensure food security 
% of agricultural land protected against soil erosion 40 64 
 Area under irrigation (hectares) 15,000 24,000 
 Use of mineral fertiliser (kgs/ha) 8 12 
 Rural households with livestock (%) 71 85 
Improve environmental management Forestry coverage (%) 20 23.5 
 Reduction in annual wood consumption (million  
cubic metres) 
8.9 6.2 
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 Ansom (2007); SIDA (2007). 
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 Republic of Rwanda (2007); IMF (2008:1). 
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 Cabazas & Rob (2006:31) and Ansoms (2007:7) termed it as ‘a second generation’ PRSP or PRSP 2. 
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 Critically degraded ecosystems mapped, assessed 
and rehabilitated (%) 
50 80 
Build infrastructure Households with access to electricity (number of 
households) 
77,000 200,000 
 Electricity generation (off/on grid, MW) 45 130 
 Classified road network in good condition (%) 11 31 
 ICT community access to telecommunication 
facilities (%) 
4 12 
 Employment in agriculture (% reporting as main 
occupation) 
80 70 
Improve health status and reduce 
slow down population growth 
Infant mortality (deaths per 1,000 live births) 86 70 
 Maternal mortality (deaths per 100,000 live births) 750 600 
 Population covered by health insurance schemes 
(%) 
70 95 
 
Women aged 15-45 using modern contraceptive 
techniques (%) 
10 70 
 Incidence of HIV among 15-24 year olds (%) 1 0.5 
 Total Fertility Rate (children per woman) 6.1 4.5 
Increase access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation 
Access to safe drinking water (% of population) 64 80 
Strengthen governance, security and 
the rule of law 
Share of population expressing 
satisfaction/confidence in decentralised governance 
(%) 
85 100 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007:45-46). Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2008-2012. 
 
The main themes of the EDPRS are growth, rural development, human development and 
governance.55 Vision 2020 umurenge is expected to accelerate the rate of poverty reduction 
through a combination of measures such as public works for the able- bodied poor, micro-
enterprise development to foster entrepreneurship and off-farm employment, have greater 
targeted access to social services for labour poor households such as community child care 
centres, adult literacy and numeracy, artisan and handicraft activities.56 This thesis will try to 
show that there is a gap that exists and it needs to be filled by the help of UIG. Rwanda is 
characterised by poor households who are not even able to purchase the simple tools like a 
hoe or a spade for farming.57 It should be noted however that although microfinance is a good 
policy to improve the lives of people, it is not those in destitution that will get the loans. At 
the same time, the public works programs, though they have a good intention of 
development, they are seasonal and fail to reach many of the poor. This leaves us in a search 
for an alternative in the event that the program came to an end. The researcher shows in 
figure 10 below that if a UIG is adopted, it will complement the EDPRS so that it can be able 
to attain its objectives by 2012 and hence enable the attainment of the Vision 2020.   
                                                
55
 Republic of Rwanda (2007:3) 
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 IMF (2008:7). 
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As discussed above it is clear that poverty and inequality exists in Rwanda.  For example if 
you look at the data in figure 3 and 4 below, child mortality and maternal mortality are 
dominant issues in the Rwandan communities. But of importance to this thesis is the fact that 
90 percent of the poor still live in the rural areas and have no means to get out of this 
destitution.58 This is why we are seeing many deaths of children during birth and mothers 
dying during labour because of poor nutrition and lack of money to visit an antenatal clinic or 
even a doctor (See figures 3 & 4). People are dying because of lack of food and money to 
visit a doctor. This is why ideas to stop this from happening are urgently needed in order to 
protect the population. 
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Figure 3: Infant Mortality 
Source: Adopted from Republic of Rwanda (2007).  
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Under- 5 Mortality
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Figure 4: Under-5 Mortality 
Source: Adopted from Republic of Rwanda (2007).  
 
Consensus now exists among donors that a more in-depth study is required of the relationship 
between growth and poverty reduction.59 The implication of this is explained in the following 
words:    
This implies that quite a bit of experimenting with what 
policies work and which not seem unavoidable. It also implies 
that ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches or policy solutions based on 
cross-country experiences simply will not do. The strategies 
will need to consider the country-specific institutional and 
structural characteristics as a starting point.60  
 
However this should not send signals that all neo-liberal policies are wrong. Our concern is 
with the fact that by the very nature of the problem in Rwanda, issues of growth, poverty 
alleviation and distributive justice cannot be resolved by pursuing only the neo-liberal 
model.61 However, this should not deter researchers from coming up with new ideas because 
if Rwanda is to attain growth and poverty alleviation this is what it needs now more than 
ever. Section 2.4 below discusses some of the social policies that Rwanda has been using to 
try and deal with poverty. These are concerned with Education and Health. Of course there 
are many social policies as the concept is very broad because it covers values policies such as 
societal well-being, welfare, redistribution of resources, social functioning, social justice and 
the provision of services. 
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2.4. Social policies used to alleviate poverty in Rwanda.  
2.4.1. Education 
 
Education became the core of the development strategy for Rwanda. This research considers 
education as a key area of social policy. There is a need to invest in education in order to 
achieve human resource development and social development.62 Every society needs to have 
good educated teachers, engineers, doctors, architectures and nurses. But for this to happen, 
you need resources which Rwanda did not have at the end of genocide in 1994. The war 
destroyed all the infrastructure of education. Schools were destroyed. Teachers and lectures 
were killed. The government of national unity recognised the importance of education in 
economic and social development. They removed the ethnic identity cards which contained 
one’s ethnicity and the quotas that existed. This was the beginning of a social policy of 
inclusion instead of that of exclusion from the previous regimes that ruled Rwanda 
immediately after independence, in 1962. Education as one of the social policies to alleviate 
poverty was met with all the above mentioned challenges. But our main concern is to 
establish if indeed education helped to address those issues and also was able to improve the 
lives of people by getting them out of destitution. 
 
In Rwanda during the first and the second Republics, the languages of instruction were 
Kinyarwanda and French. But after the end of the 1994 genocide, the 1959 refugees came 
back to Rwanda from different countries which were English speaking. And since the system 
before was built on the back born of the French system, there was a need for English schools 
to be built.63 With the help of the international organisations, the government of national 
unity was able to address issues of capacity building, construction of English speaking 
schools, improving the enrolment rates in primary schools and a reduction in the illiteracy 
rate.64 (See Figure 5 below). 
 
                                                
62
 Midgley & Hall (2004:160). 
63
 World Bank (2003:91-109). 
64
 Obura, A. (2003:1-15). 
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Figure 5: Enrolment rate at primary school (%) 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007). Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06 
 
There was a great improvement in the primary enrolment from the city of Kigali up to the 
rural area from the years 2000/01 to 2005/06. Enrolment in Primary school increased to 86 
percent (See Figure 5 above). However, looking at table 9 below, there indications that 
children are not attending school at the right age. 
 
Table 9: School currently attended by children and young adults (% of age group) 
Age Primary Above primary1 None Total 
7-9 80 0 20 100 
10-12 91 0 8 100 
13-15 74 4 22 100 
16-18 27 16 57 100 
19-21 4 19 77 100 
22-24 0 9 91 100 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007). Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06 
 
Enrolment rate at secondary schools was not the same as that at primary level. Performance 
was better in the city of Kigali, for there was an increase from 24 percent to 29 percent. Yet 
in the rural areas it is only 8 percent in 2005/06 in the rural areas from a mere 5 percent in 
2000/01. Enrolment in secondary school increased to only 10%. See figure 6 below.  
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Figure 6: Enrolment rate at secondary school (%) 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007). Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06. 
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Figure 7: Literacy rate (%) 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007). Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06 
 
The overall literacy rate improved from 65 percent in 2000/01 to 77 percent in 2005/06. Also 
as far as gender issues are concerned, although males were more than females in 
2000/01(72% to 60%), in 2005/06 the number of males and females that were literate was 
equal to (77%). (See Figure 7 above). 
 
It should be noted however, that today people living in rural areas are continuously gaining 
access to education facilities. It is estimated that 37% (three million people) of the rural 
population are in communities where primary schools have been built. This indicates that 
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there is an improvement as compared to 32% in 2000-01. Two thirds of the rural 
communities today have at least one adult literacy program. This has tremendous impact on 
poverty alleviation in the long run. 
 
All said and done, today in Rwanda, not all children have access to those education facilities 
that are provided to them. And yet both primary education and the first three years of 
secondary school (Lower secondary school level) commonly known as ‘Tronc commun’65 are 
free for all. This is due to the costs involved that each household in Rwanda at least has to 
spend on education even though public primary schools are free.  
 
It has been estimated that an average household pays FRW 1,845, on education per child in 
primary school, per annum. 42% of the household expenditures go to uniforms and 37% goes 
to books and stationery. Other costs go to items such as transport, food and of course not 
forgetting donations to the school. This amount of money cannot be afforded by households 
that live in the rural areas (umutindi nyakujya-those in abject poverty, umutindi-the very 
poor, umukene- the poor), because of the prevalence of poverty.66  One wonders whether this 
education is helping the poor households to get out of poverty or it is moving them deeper 
into the poverty trap. It should be noted that there are enrolment fees at private schools. 
 
The cost of schooling at secondary level is another serious issue. On average, each household 
that has a child going to secondary school pays FRW 68,300 on education. The amount of 
money households spend on children in secondary schools is 37 times more than what they 
spend on children in primary schools. However, the government has introduced a policy of 
free tuition for the first three years of secondary school. But this does not rule out the extra 
costs per child as we illustrated in the case of children at primary schools. They will 
definitely need to spend on uniforms, books and stationery. They will have to provide 
transport, food and above all give donations to secondary schools. 
 
It has been established that there is a link between improved household incomes and 
improvements in education attainment when a grant is given to poor households on a monthly 
basis.67 This is supported both by theory and practice that once a UIG is given to the poor 
                                                
65
 Republic of Rwanda (2006:15). 
66
 See table 2 for an in-depth illustration. 
67
 Alderman (1996);Behrman & Wolf (1987a,b);Birdsall(1985);Deolalikar (1993); King & Lillard (1987). 
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household, it will increase that households’ disposable income.68 With the increased 
disposable income this household  is able to send their children to school rather than going to 
work in order to earn an income or to help their parents in food production, in case of 
subsistence farmers.69 The impact of this grant in terms of poverty alleviation is emulated in 
the increase in numbers of girls attending school and the impact it has on them.70 This can be 
substantiated by the research that was done in South Africa which came up with a conclusion 
that in order to determine human development one needed to educate females in infant 
survival and child nutrition.71 An increase in school attendance from the poor households is 
assumed to improve future productivity, add to human capital, increase economic growth and 
above all have a long-term solution to HIV/AIDS.72 Once you have a workforce that is 
educated, innovation is high and economic performance is attained because of having 
improvements in capital productivity.73 This conforms to the aspirations of the EDPRS.74 
 
2.4.2. Health 
 
Health is paramount in as far as development is concerned. You cannot have good doctors or 
engineers when your health system is flowed. It is from this understanding that as part of the 
development phase Rwanda has decided to encourage every Rwandan to at least visit a clinic 
or a hospital. It is visible from the figure 8 below that in 2000/01 the percent of people who 
consulted a doctor were between 12 percent to 35 percent. However in 2005/06, the 
percentage increased from 20 percent to 45 percent. This means that measures are being put 
in place to combat disease in Rwanda as per the requirements of the Vision 2020, the EDPRS 
and the MDGs. See figure 8 below to see how ill households in Rwanda go for consultation 
following their poverty levels.  
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 Ranis & Stewart (2000). 
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74
 Republic of Rwanda (2007). 
 
 
 
 
  
39 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Poorest Wealthiest
Poverty level of household
Ill
 
pe
o
pl
e 
w
ho
 
ha
d 
m
ed
ic
al
 
co
n
su
lta
tio
n
 
(%
)
2005-06 2000-01
 
Figure 8: Proportion of ill people who have a consultation, by poverty level (%) 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007). Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06 
 
When you compare figures 8 and 9, you will discover that there is a cost involved in either 
consulting a nurse or doctor. Yes, households working in urban areas in the formal sector 
have insurance. Poor households living in the rural areas are currently insured  under 
“mutuelles de santé”. Commonly known as:  
a community -based health insurance scheme that operates at a 
community level, which people pay into regularly. What should 
be noted is the fact that they are required to contribute at least 
FRW 1000, in oder to access medical services. They can then 
use some of the funds if they need to pay for certain health care 
problems.75  
 
Again let us be realistic in trying to analyse the poverty situaton on the ground bearing in 
mind at the same time the kind of social policy that may be adopted as a remedy. Where will 
those in abject poverty (umutindi nyakujya), the very poor (umukene) and the poor 
(umukene) get that FRW 1000 from? Looking at the poverty levels that exist in those rural 
areas and the unemployment therewith and the fact that there are 5.4 million people76 who are 
living in poverty, this did not stop households in rural areas to subscribe to mutual insurance. 
Figure 9 below shows that mutual insurance covered 38 percent and the other 5 percent was 
covered by the Rwandan national insurance scheme (RAMA). However it should be noted 
that although mutual insurance has expanded as seen from figure 9, there are still many 
                                                
75
 Republic of Rwanda (2007:36); Republic of Rwanda (2004); Hatlebakk & Øystein (2005);; Bennett, S. et al. 
(1998). 
76
 Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06. 
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people who still don’t have health insurance.77 This is why there in a need for an 
interventionist social policy. The researcher believes that the UIG may provide that remedy to 
fill the gap that may hinder Rwanda from attaining its Vision 2020 and the MDGs. 
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Figure 9:  Proportion of the population with health insurance (%) 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007). Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06 
 
Table 10: Person seen during medical consultation (%) 
 2000–01  2005–06 
Person consulted Poorest 20% Wealthiest 
20% 
 Poorest 20% Wealthiest 
20% 
Nurse / healthcare 
worker 
59 46  65 56 
Doctor 9 40  12 31 
Traditional healer 26 10  17 8 
Other 6 4  6 5 
Total 100 100  100 100 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007). Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06 
 
Looking at table 10 above, there is  inequality in terms of person seen during medical 
consultaion, that is visible between the poorest 20% and the wealthiest 20%.   During the 
2000-01 survey, 59 percent from the poorest 20 percent of the households visited a 
nurse/health worker. And 46 percent from the wealthiest 20 percent of the households visited 
                                                
77
 Republic of Rwanda (2007:21). 
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the nurse/health worker.  However during the 2005-06 survey there was an improvement 
because 65 percent from the poorest 20 percent of the households visited a nursse/health 
worker. And 56 percent of the wealthiest 20 percent of the households visited a nurse/health 
worker. In 2000-01 survey, only 9 percent from the poorest 20 percent of the households saw 
a docter while 40 percent from the wealthiest 20 percent of the households visited the doctor. 
In 2005-06 survey there was a statistically significant increase because  12 percent from the 
poorest 20 percent of the households saw a doctor while 31 percent from the wealthiest 20 
percent of the households saw a doctor. Although there is an increase in the number of 
households among the poorest 20 percent who visited a doctor, a lot is still to be desired 
when compared to the wealthiest 20 percent of the households. What is disturbing most is the 
fact that in the 21st Century, there are households in Rwanda that still go to traditional 
healers. In 2000-01, 20 percent of the poorest households visited a traditional healer and 10 
percent from the wealthiest households visited a traditional healer. In 2005-06 survey, 17 
pecent from the poorest 20 of the households  while only 8 percent from the wealthiest 
households visited a taditional healer. What does this imply for the Rwandan society where 
5.4 million people live in poverty? What is the fate of those in abject poverty (umutindi 
nyaujya),the very poor (uutindi), and the poor (umukene)? It is clear that although there are 
measures in place to make Rwanda a disease free country, poverty still looms.78  
 
We believe the UIG is the possible means that will empower these households to be able to 
contribute that FRW 1000 to access the health facilities so that they stop going to traditional 
healers for treatment. The grant will also enable these poorest 20 percent of the households to 
afford good nutritious foods to avoid diseases.  
 
2.5. Why a Universal income grant is an appropriate social policy to deal with poverty 
in Rwanda 
The rationale is that Rwanda has 5.4 million people living in poverty.79 And in order for 
Rwanda to attain its Vision 2020 and the MDGs, it ought to adopt a social policy that will 
advocate for universalism rather than means-tested support. There is evidence that cash 
transfers exist in Rwanda today under the Ubudehe project but they are not universal in 
                                                
78Profile of Livivng conditions in Rwanda, 2005-06  
79
 Those in abject poverty (umutindi nyakujya), the very poor (umutindi) and the poor (umukene). 
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nature as the UIG could be, they are means tested.80  A UIG Based on the fact that it is 
universal, it is able to reach many people and there is no stigma attached to it.81 
 
 It should be noted however that the main reason the researcher is advocating for a UIG is 
because it has the potential to eradicate destitution, reduce poverty and inequality.82 It has 
been proven that means-test social policies can be very expensive, wasteful, and ineffective 
in targeting people and yet a UIG is self targeting.83  Means-test creates a poverty-trap due to 
the fact that once a beneficiary of the grant decides to look for a job and earn extra income he 
is penalized, hence creating dependence.84 The UIG instead of discouraging members of 
these poor households from searching for work, it will help them to get out of the vicious 
cycle of poverty by facilitating them to search for work.85 There is evidence from research 
that an increase in disposable income of a poor household not only acts as a safety net but it 
is also a springboard where people are able to find a job and also be able to earn an income.86  
 
The researcher believes that the state still needs to play a more active role in as far as social 
welfare and redistribution are concerned. However, the dynamics at play still remain a 
paradox especially when it comes to identifying the kind of redistribution system to be used. 
It is evident that differing ideological views play a significant role in Rwanda. 
 
 After the genocide of 1994, Rwanda got ‘emergence aid’ as budget support. As it starts its 
‘development phase’, more aid is still coming to the country. The purpose of this thesis is to 
try and investigate whether a combination of a UIG and foreign aid could be the appropriate 
social policy that may help get the 5.4 million people out of poverty and destitution. The 
researcher however, believes that a possibility of attaining a UIG is possible only if aid is 
forthcoming. It should be noted however, that this is also a sustainable way of absorbing 
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 Samson, M. et al., (2002:13). 
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foreign aid because it is redistributed to the poor people who deserve it. This goes without 
saying that if good policies are in place then aid can be used to alleviate poverty. 87   
 
Figure 10 below is trying to show how the researcher assumes the universal targeting 
approach to work.  It should be noted however that one of the major prerequisite for proper 
targeting of the poor via the UIG is the tax system. The Rwanda Revenue Authority over the 
past eight (2001-2008) years has managed to reflect a good transformation process. And 
when a country has an appropriate tax reform that is at the same time linked to the UIG will 
be able to achieve very effective redistribution. 88   
 
The debate on which amount is adequate for the grant is still a long way to be resolved. It is 
very important that while arguing one should remove the myth around the adequate grant as 
we go deeper into our debate on a UIG. The researcher would like to bring it to the attention 
of the readers that the core concern of this thesis is to try and come up with an option that 
may help get the 5.4 million people get out of poverty in Rwanda. This is why in the micro-
simulation model that is in Chapter four, the researcher has given several options that he 
deems to be adequate as a grant.  
 
It is assumed that the UIG will be calculated on an individual basis. It means therefore that an 
individual leaving alone gets say Rwf 213 per month.89 However, a household having six (6) 
members will have more income to the tune of Rwf 1.278 per month. Does this mean 
therefore that this could also be a solution to the rapid population growth in Rwanda? Well, 
this can be informed with concrete research when a UIG is adopted. It should be noted 
however that for this money to be of use to the household, it must be given to the caregivers 
who are mainly women since they are responsible for childcare in the day-to-day life. 
However because of HIV/AIDS and genocide, the social roles have changed because you 
now have women headed households, and child-headed households.90  
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 Goldin & Reinert (2007:129). 
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 Samson, M. et al., (2002:14). 
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2.5.1. Social Capital 
Social capital in Rwanda was destroyed after the genocide of 1994. People who used to leave 
together in harmony all of a sudden turned into cold blooded killers. This in the end led to the 
presence of a poverty-conflict trap in Rwanda.91 In order to instil social capital among the 
Rwandan community, a lot has to be done but the most important ones are to provide 
education that is inclusive and not exclusive, provide health facilities and good nutrition, 
provide them with cash transfers to enable them form cooperatives or community based 
organisations and above all promote social stability.92 A UIG is that cash transfer that the 
researcher deems to have the potential to build this social capital in Rwanda.  
 
 
Figure 10: Implications of a Universal Income Grant (UIG) partly financed from Foreign Aid. 
Source: Authors 
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2.5.2. Stimulate aggregate spending. 
When a UIG is redistributed among the poor households it is expected to stimulate their 
aggregate spending especially among the non-durable goods.93 This is true with the Rwanda 
case because they will not purchase food stuff using the grant since it is auto-consumed.94  
 
2.5.3. Increase economic activity 
The substantial increase in economic activity generated economically by income transfers 
will tend to increase capacity utilisation, probably more with non-durable manufacturing than 
with durable goods. This spending will provide a demand-side stimulus that increases the 
demand for labour, promoting increased employment.95 It is alleged that if a UIG is given to 
the unemployed, it will act as a disincentive for them to provide their labour to the market. 
However empirical evidence from South Africa shows that these poor households once they 
get the grant are encouraged to go out and find a job.96 This is in line with the first flagship of 
the EDPRS where it puts emphasis on creation of jobs as the way to achieve Vision 2020. 
 
2.5.4. Bring investor confidence 
Investors would like to invest in an environment where there is no corruption and there is 
abundance of labour onto the market. However, for this to be possible they need to be given a 
grant which is expected to stimulate their spending and in the end there will be an increase in 
economic activity. This is also in line to the first flagship where investments are expected to 
be increased in order to achieve Vision 2020.What should be noted here is the fact that 
corruption must be erased for good in order to win investor confidence. In the third flagship 
of the EDPRS which emphasises good governance, the crux is on ensuring a corruption free 
country.  
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2.5.5. Promote economic growth and job creation. 
A UIG may stimulate economic growth by either boosting aggregate demand or shifting 
spending towards those sectors that absorb labour in economy. By shifting resources from 
savings to consumption, a UIG stimulates the overall level of economic activity hence it has 
the potential to shift the composition of spending towards labour-absorbing sectors of the 
economy.  The spending of the lower groups tends to concentrate on labour-absorbing sectors 
of the economy. Income transfers to the poor shift aggregate demand towards labour-
intensive job-creating industries, because it increases the consumption of the poor, the 
composition of which is relatively labour-intensive. Redistributing income to lower income 
individuals is likely to stimulate job creation, particularly if appropriate policies are 
implemented to enable the unemployed to undertake productive activities that meet the 
resulting increased economic demand.97 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Poverty in Rwanda is still rampant. This is why the government has set itself goals through 
Vision 2020 to be able to transform from a low income country into a middle income country 
by the year 2020. But for this to be possible, the 5.4 million people living in poverty need to 
be rescued via a redistributive social policy approach such as UIG. 
 
Education as a social policy to address poverty and illiteracy in Rwanda also has a lot to be 
desired. Much as the past social policies of exclusion are today done with, the fact that most 
households are poor (5.4 million people), they are excluded from enjoying the fruits of 
education because they cannot afford the expenses that go with it. And this is happening even 
when the country is supposed to enjoy achievements of the universal primary and universal 
secondary education. 
 
Health is another area of social policy that also has short falls. It is the expectation of 
government to be able to have a disease free country where malaria, Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS 
are controlled. Infant and Mortality death rates need to be brought down. But again because 
of the 5.4 million people that are living in poverty, they are excluded from getting the health 
services on the pretext that they can’t afford it.  
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The researcher declares that a UIG partly financed from foreign aid has not been investigated 
in detail before. This is why the possibility of combining a UIG and foreign aid as an 
appropriate social policy to alleviate poverty in Rwanda is investigated in this dissertation.  
 
I would want to argue that if it is done it will enable Rwanda attain its Vision 2020 and the 
MDGs. Chapter three is going to deal with the literature review/theoretical framework. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review/Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This dissertation is about the search for an appropriate social policy option that could be used 
to alleviate poverty in Rwanda. However, the concept social policy and the UIG/BIG) need to 
be conceptualised in depth without excluding all the debates that surround them. It is in light 
of this, that chapter three will outline the different views on social policy both from a 
developed and a developing perspective. It will also embark on analysing the literature 
review with regard to the origins and evolution of the UIG also commonly known as a Basic 
Income Grant (BIG) especially in developed countries. Furthermore, it is going to investigate 
how the UIG has been interpreted in developing countries, more especially middle-income 
countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Brazil. It also considers some low-income 
countries that have used income-transfers as a form of assistance to its citizens, like 
Mozambique and Brazil.  
 
Since foreign aid is very important to the growth of many developing countries, although not 
necessarily depending on it, this thesis will introduce the trend of foreign aid in Rwanda in 
order to show that although there has been massive flow of aid into the country, poverty still 
prevails. Evidence is presented of donors and other bilateral and multilateral organisations. 
The argument that there is a need to channel aid directly to poverty alleviation in order for 
Rwanda to be able to attain its Vision 2020 and the MDGs is developed. It is from this 
background that this dissertation introduces a UIG that could be given to all Rwandans even 
though it is a low-income country. The researcher believes that Rwanda with its ambitious 
Vision 2020 and the EDPRS is able to be transformed into a middle-income country by 2020 
and also simultaneously attain the MDGs. The bone of contention in this thesis is the 
inclusion of foreign aid which has not been used by the developed world, the bilateral and 
multilateral organisations and the developing world. The original research and model that 
was developed by Le Roux for South Africa and Namibia, and then first applied to Rwanda 
by Musahara, is further developed. The researcher believes that this research could make a 
new contribution to the already existing research on appropriate social policy options that can 
be used to alleviate poverty. 
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3.2. Social Policy 
According to the explanatory or analytical theory98 there are several theories stating how 
social policies evolved. To some it is believed to have been industrialization and urbanization 
that motivated governments to extend social welfare provisions. Others argue that even 
before the industrial boom, families, churches and the nobility took responsibility for those in 
destitution. While others say that it was the interest groups, trade unions and religious 
organisations that promoted social policy expansion in order to get rid of inequalities, 
unemployment and poverty. Others have asserted that since appropriate social programs 
could prevent political unrest and also maintain order this has motivated governments to 
adopt new social policies.99 
 
It should be noted that modernization destroyed the pre-industrial modes of social production 
which gave a central role to the family, church, nobility, the community and in the end 
brought about social mobility, urbanisation, individualism and market dependence. Up until 
now the most spoken of factors that are believed to have influenced social policy in Europe 
are rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and population changes.100 
 
Social policies implemented in the developing countries are in most cases directly adopted 
from the developed world and applied without any alterations and yet their initial goals and 
aims differ tremendously.101 Unlike in Europe, in Africa, almost all countries depend on 
subsistence agriculture for their survival and their industrial base is very small. It therefore 
means that you cannot use the same social policies that were used in Europe to solve Africa’s 
problems. Africa needs social policies that are able to address the circumstances that its 
people live in. Therefore the notion that ‘one size fits all’ does not make sense.  
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Social policy is a field of study that is controversial.  This is why we have a number of 
scholars all concentrating on trying to define social policy. 102  But the question that comes 
into our mind is, ‘Will this bring a lasting solution to the inequalities, unemployment and 
poverty’? Let us go through the debates below and see how scholars were struggling to come 
up with appropriate definitions that they found useful at the time. But we should remember 
that times change. 
 
Social policy is perceived by some as “a deliberate intervention by the state to redistribute resources 
amongst its citizens so as to achieve a welfare objective.”103 It is further understood as “that part of 
public policy that has to do with social issues such as public access to social programs, aim at improving 
human welfare and above all be able to meet the human needs for education, health, housing and social 
security”.104 It is regarded by some as “a particular policy of government which has a direct impact on the 
welfare of its citizens and that this impact can be translated into providing them with either services or 
income”.105 To others it is “a collective action for social welfare where all the people are equal”. Here 
the idea of an egalitarian society was being echoed against the understanding that the state 
has the resources and the capacity to affect the distribution process.106  
 
Social policy may also be described as government interventions that are specifically 
designed to affect individual behaviour by enabling people to have the command over their 
resources, influence the economic system, and in the end be able to shape the society in 
which they live.107 Others still maintain that although improvement of human welfare is 
deemed important, there is a call for social policy to put an emphasis on meeting the human 
needs, in particular for education, health, water and sanitation, housing and social security.108 
To some social policy means the provision of welfare or the well-being of society. Here it is 
emphasised that social policy should comprise of income maintenance and social services, 
education and training policy, employment policy and housing policy.109 However, we should 
bear in mind that the issue of what is appropriate social policy is full of controversy. Arguing 
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about definitions will not help much, especially if we are searching for alternative options to 
achieve poverty alleviation. We should address the real issues, in this case by targeting the 
policy areas such as social security, personal social services, health services, education, 
employment services and housing.110  It is time to start addressing poverty with genuine 
solutions and not imaginary formulas or dreams commonly known by the developed world 
as, ‘utopia’. In Africa and particularly in Rwanda, poverty is real and so there is a need for 
appropriate social policies to eliminate poverty.  
 
Since social policies originated from the developed world, it is clear from the definitions 
given above that the bias exists. To the developed world social policy means provision of 
social security and there must be government intervention to carry out the redistribution 
process. They are industrialised, which means that they are able to provide more jobs to their 
citizens. And for those that are not employed, provision is made for them to get out of the 
poverty-trap.  However, it is different in the case of developing countries.  In most countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa livelihood depends on subsistence agriculture. Most people are not 
catered for in terms of social security. Those that are employed in the public sector are often 
privileged and have social security. But how can all those people living in rural poverty be 
reached? The introduction of a UIG, funded by the indirect taxes (VAT) and other indirect 
taxes such as (taxes on alcohol, fuel, cigarettes etc) and then supplemented by foreign aid will 
make the relatively affluent bear the burden of financing the grant while the poor gain from 
this targeted grant in order to ameliorate their poverty situation.111   
 
 3.3. Evolution of a Universal Income Grant (BIG) 
In this section we are considering how the UIG also commonly known as basic income grant 
(BIG) evolved from a policy proposal for the developed world to one for the developing 
world. In the developing world, we first look at middle-income countries such as South 
Africa, Namibia and Brazil. It should be noted however, that the rationale of this thesis is that 
even a low-income country such as Rwanda may implement a UIG if it is funded by VAT 
and other indirect taxes such as fuel, alcohol and cigarettes, and supplemented by foreign aid.  
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3.3.1. Basic Income Grant (BIG) or UIG in the developed world 
The concept ‘basic income for all citizens’ was first introduced by Thomas More in a 1516 
publication entitled, ‘Utopia, an island of perfect society’. 112  One could say that this was the 
origin of the idea of a basic income grant. Moore had a dream of a society (utopia) that could 
guarantee the means of survival for all its citizens by providing them with a minimal level of 
income. It is worth noting that this is the seminal work from which a basic income for all 
citizens gained significant support in a range of disciplines such as economics, philosophy 
and sociology. And although authors came from different backgrounds and proposed 
different solutions, they all agreed on the need of redistribution to eliminate poverty in a 
particular nation.113 The policies proposed have enabled most of the developed world to get 
large sections of its population out of poverty and to overcome unemployment, a hurdle 
Africa has a long way to achieve as long as our scholars are caught up in ideological debates 
and do not focus on finding a lasting solution for poverty.  
 
A number of scholars have written about UIG or commonly known as a BIG.114 Juan Luis 
Vives one of Thomas Moore’s friends in his search for an appropriate form of assistance to 
the poor, proposed the first basic minimum income, while living in Bruges, a small city in 
today’s Belgium.115 It is important to note here that the grant was being suggested in a small 
city, then why can’t we introduce the same idea in a small country like Rwanda? The 
researcher is of the view that once government has the political will and the concern for 
growth which has redistributive justice and not just subscribing to any ideology with the 
intention to promote the interests of the few in the light of the entire population, then 
economic and social development may be achieved.  
 
Thomas Spence came up with a radical view advocating an egalitarian society. According to 
him the surplus of state taxes was supposed to be equally divided and distributed to everyone 
living in that society irrespective of their gender, marriage status, age or wealth. He 
advocated for universalism instead of means-tested approaches towards addressing the social 
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evils of society.116 It is again very clear from Thomas Spence that means-testing had failed to 
yield results and that the only probable remedy was a universal redistribution of resources for 
it would reach the entire population.  
 
Van Parijs who is also the co-founder of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) started by 
informing us of the different names a BIG/UIG has. He said that it can be referred to as 
“universal wage’, ‘territorial dividend’, ‘demogrant’, ‘citizen’s wage’, ‘social dividend’, ‘basic income’, or 
‘national dividend”. And that “it is the sole responsibility of the political community to pay out this income, 
which in the end will enable it to trickle down through to all its members on an individual basis, without work 
requirements or a means test”.117 Therefore he defines a BIG/UIG in a broad sense as: 
Paid in cash, other than in kind. It must be paid on a regular 
basis rather than a once –off endowment. It must be paid by a 
political community (it could be a nation state, a state within a 
country or by multi-national organisation such as the United 
Nations). It must be paid to all its members (which may be 
restricted to citizens, but also may be expanded to include all 
legal permanent residents. Children are included as well 
although the actual payment will go to the care-taker). It must 
be paid to each individual rather than to each household or to 
its head (as is the case under most existing guaranteed 
minimum schemes). It should be noted however, that the 
amount given to the individual is uniform, as opposed to being 
adjusted based on the household size (it does not account for 
economies of scale) and above all it is paid irrespective of 
income and does away with a means test.118 
 
 It is clear from Van Parijs that the emphasis is on universalism rather than targeting or 
means-testing.  
 
 James E. Meade, a prominent economist and a Nobel Laureate, is known to be an intellectual 
giant of the 21st Century. He made a significant contribution to the universal income debate. 
He has consistently advocated for the implementation of a citizen income in the book he 
published entitled: ‘Agathotopia’.119  
 
 
                                                
116
 Rhee (2007);Spence (1797). 
117
 Rhee (2007);Van Parijs (2000a:2). 
118
 Rhee (2007);Van Parijs (2004); Le Roux (2002). 
119
 Rhee (2007). 
 
 
 
 
  
54 
This is how popular the BIG or UIG was in Europe. It can be seen that all the scholars in the 
developed world, because they were surrounded by inequality, unemployment and poverty at 
the time, their main concern was finding solutions that are sustainable.  They believed in a 
universal social policy instead of means-tested support.  
 
There is a possibility of introducing a UIG in a middle-income country such as South Africa, 
a country which was affected by the apartheid form of governance whose social policy was of 
exclusion instead of inclusion. And of interest is the fact that it has been suggested by a 
scholar as astute as Van Parijs, that you can not fund a BIG in a developing country. Now 
when you compare the dynamics at play here, there are double standards when it comes to 
Africa in its quest to get out of poverty for good just as the developed countries did it. If a 
small city in Belgium could start thinking of instituting a UIG, sincerely why can’t South 
Africa adopt it? The debate has ensued and Le Roux in his presentation to the Taylor 
committee showed that it was possible to fund a BIG in South Africa at a reasonable net 
cost.120 
 
3.3.2. UIG OR BIG in developing and middle-income countries. 
 
3.3.2.1. South Africa 
During the apartheid regime, not all South Africa’s citizens were treated equally. The state 
promoted a redistributive system of exclusion. It is only the minority that benefited from the 
social policies then. After the first democratic elections held in 1994, there was a need to 
correct past mistakes and make social policies available to all South Africans. There was a 
desire to develop a comprehensive social policy in order to reduce the inequalities that 
existed in South Africa. The government in its bid to achieve this appointed Professor 
Vivienne Taylor from UCT, who was one of the lecturers at the University of the Western 
Cape (UWC) before, to head the commission (which was named the Taylor Commission) in 
2002.121 A number of scholars have written about the BIG in South Africa.122 They all reckon 
that this social policy option is the answer to eliminating destitution in South Africa. But the 
means to achieving this differs from scholar to scholar because they come from different 
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ideological backgrounds. The researcher sees this as the reason why developing countries are 
failing to implement home grown social policies and end up just adopting those that are 
dictated to them by the international organisations such as the World Bank and IMF.123  
 
Le Roux strongly argued for the introduction of a BIG in middle- income countries such as 
South Africa and Namibia in order to address the inequality, unemployment and poverty.124 It 
should be noted that in his calculation which was in a paper he presented to the Taylor 
commission, he proved wrong Van Parijs when he showed that: 
UIG was an appropriate policy (albeit at levels well below the 
poverty line) for middle-income developing countries with high 
levels of unemployment, a highly skewed distribution of 
income, a relatively inefficient bureaucracy, and with a high 
proportion of the population living in destitution.125   
 
It is clear from his statement above that he was advocating for an alternative way of thinking 
in as far as social welfare redistribution was concerned. He was dealing with the realities on 
the ground and not a‘utopia’ as most scholars in Europe have always regarded it. 
 
 In South Africa the poverty and destitution is real. One therefore needs to come up with 
concrete solutions if the society is to leave in harmony and also be able to sustain economic 
growth. Le Roux argued for the Taylor Committee findings that an amount of R100 is given 
to every citizen and all permanent residences of South Africa. However his approach of 
where the funds will come from is that indirect taxes such as VAT and other indirect taxes 
such as cigarettes, fuel and alcohol be increased proportionally in order to fund the UIG. If 
this is done well, according to him, then it will be possible to target the net benefit in favour 
of those who are most in need, and at the same time imposing the net burden on those who 
spent the most.126  The BIG got support from COSATU, the Council of Churches and other 
civil society organisations. But COSATU were of the view that income tax should be used to 
fund the grant and not the expenditure tax. However, the government eventually rejected the 
UIG. Nevertheless, with the high rates of inequality, unemployment and chronic poverty, the 
South African government may well have to reconsider the duty it has to its citizens which is 
enshrined in its constitution to eliminate destitution. 
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It should be noted that although Le Roux proved Van Parijs wrong, and also started 
advocating for a universal approach instead of means-tested grants, this researcher is of the 
view that instead of him advocating for the UIG to be introduced in a middle-income country 
like South Africa, the emphasis should have been on advocating for it to be adopted in Africa 
irrespective of whether it is a middle-income or a low-income country. The best way to fight 
poverty is by taking a unanimous position. This is how scholars from the developed countries 
did it. They took a universal stand on poverty and that is why they were able to get rid of it. 
 
It is the work of this thesis to try and search for a possibility of developing a model for low -
income countries for instance Rwanda. But this is expected to be achieved if the answer to 
this question is a yes: ‘Is it not possible to apply the same model in Rwanda which was used 
by Le Roux of adopting a social policy option where a UIG is financed out of an increase in 
indirect taxes, such as VAT and other indirect taxes (fuel, cigarettes and alcohol) and then 
supplementing it by foreign aid in order to address destitution?’  
 
Rhee in her Master’s mini-thesis showed that the UIG was financially affordable.127 Using le 
Roux’s model, she concluded by saying that a UIG in today’s’ circumstances in South Africa 
looks to be the only viable option of reducing inequality, providing employment and above 
all alleviating poverty.128 Again it can be noted that among the scholars from the developing 
world although divided on principles of ideology and not on solving the destitution problem, 
they are all in agreement that there must be a universal approach of redistribution and not 
means-tested.  
 
3.3.2.2. Brazil 
In Brazil they also have cash transfers which are also targeted or means-tested. The Bolsa 
familia was initiated in October 2003 by President Lula when he combined the four income 
transfers that existed at the time. Here we are talking about school scholarships, cash food 
aid, gas subsidy and food cards. The impact became visible and as a result recipients 
increased from 2.3 million families in October to 3.5 families in December 2003. It then 
increased to 8.7 million families by December 2005. The programme caters mainly for 
families with a monthly per capita income which is below R$100. It should be noted however 
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that although this programme targeted over 11.2 million families (about 45million people), it 
is conditional in nature and to prove one’s eligibility you will need a thorough verification 
process.129 As a response to this shortfall, in 2005 a Citizen’s Basic Income was introduced. 
Suplicy130 who is a member of the Brazilian Senate, advisor to President Lula and a 
proponent of the Citizen’s Basic Income played a very important part in its introduction. The 
grant was to be given to all Brazilian residents, citizens and foreigners who have stayed in the 
country for more than five years irrespective of their social status.131 However, it should be 
noted that although it was passed by parliament, the process of implementing it is still 
pending. You will see that the Bolsa familia on its own was means-tested.  
 
3.3.3. A UIG OR BIG in low-income countries 
3.3.3.1. Mozambique  
In Mozambique, after the decade-long civil war and the flood in early 2000, cash transfers 
were given to the citizens and this created a positive impact to the livelihood of the citizens. 
These cash transfers were mainly given to the demobilised soldiers to enable them to start a 
new way of life. They managed to start up small businesses, build houses and also take their 
children to school.132 To the flood victims the government also gave cash transfers to help 
them resettle. Although little in amount, larger households were able to use these monies to 
purchase goods and services. They were able to build houses, start up small businesses and 
also buy plots of land for cultivation. Their children were able to go to school.  
 
They were able to visit a medical centre.133 This was testimony enough to show that with the 
help of the international community even low–income countries are able to provide cash 
transfers to their citizens. And if this is possible in Mozambique, then other low-income 
countries such as Rwanda could follow-suit. However it should be noted that these cash 
transfers are targeted or means-tested. They are either for settling down demobilised soldiers 
or resettling food victims. We are advocating a universal approach towards getting the entire 
population out of poverty irrespective of whether you were a flood victim or a demobilised 
soldier. This provides the population with a constant flow of income and they are able to 
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participate in the main stream of the economy by either searching for a job, joining the 
informal sector and above all be able to take their children to school. 
 
3.3.3.2. Rwanda 
Rwanda is categorised as a low-income country.134 It is also true that cash transfers in the 
majority of countries support government programs. And this in the end helps in attaining 
growth and reducing poverty.135 The rationale of this dissertation is that cash transfers 
actually do exist in Rwanda, under the Ubudehe project, but it is means-tested and not 
universal in nature. Then all those genocide survivors are provided with cash transfers to 
enable them go to school, buy food and also be able to go to hospital. Again it is targeted to 
assist only the genocide survivors. Rwanda’s growth pattern is controversial in the sense that 
in practice they follow a neoliberal growth path and yet claim to be pursuing a pro-poor 
growth path.136 This is why there is a need to adopt an appropriate social policy of 
redistribution that is sustainable in nature and which advocates for universalism.137  
 
A UIG was identified as one of the best options for Rwanda to get out of the poverty-conflict 
trap. It was further argued that for the sake of Rwanda, if the grant is financed by increasing 
the indirect taxes (VAT and other luxury taxes) and supporting it with foreign aid, then 
poverty can be effectively challenged.138  
 
The turning point in the UIG debate came when Musahara not only challenged the status quo 
but actually argued that it is possible to finance a BIG out of indirect taxes in a low-income 
country like Rwanda.139 Rwanda of course hopes, through its Vision 2020, to become a 
middle-income country by the year 2020. It is in this context that Musahara argued that a BIG 
financed by indirect taxes will be an appropriate social policy that will help to diminish 
poverty far more rapidly than through a trickle down model.140   
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This Literature review cannot be complete without a discussion on the alternative approaches 
to social policy outlined by Devereux & Cook, Le Roux, Midgley & Hall, Mkandawire, 
Adesina and Musahara.   
 
3.4. Alternative Approaches to Social Policy 
Most African countries just cut and paste the social policies they are today using without 
considering their compatibility to the circumstances on the ground. This explains why 
scholars have decided to look at social policy from an African context. They specifically 
emphasize the need to rethink social policy.141  
 
Alternative approaches to social policy in low income countries are urgently needed.142 
Transfers of northern social policy objectives, programmes and instruments to Africa do not 
match local realities, simply because they are always assumed.143 And this is the main reason 
as to why current social policies existing in Africa have failed to address the social needs of 
the people. Today in the social policy discourse worldwide there is a growing use of concepts 
like social protection, social security, social insurance, social sectors, social rights to mention 
but a few. Nevertheless one would wonder which one is the best answer to the poverty 
problem. And I believe that this begs for a search of an appropriate word to be used which 
might be inclusive of all the five categories as Devereux & Cook put it in their scope of social 
policy.144  
 
Here a revolutionary way of thinking by emphasizing bottom-up approach if you are to solve 
Africa’s poverty is introduced. Their contribution to this debate is so remarkable in the sense 
that today we have the scope of social policy. Social policy is very wide and this is why its 
scope must be understood before one can start identifying the options to follow.145 See Table 
6 for the scope of social policy. Nevertheless, these are semantics that need to be understood 
clearly from their point of view.   
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Table 11: The Scope of Social Policy 
Social Sectors Health, Education, Water and Sanitation, Housing 
Social Insurance Pensions, Unemployment benefits, Disability 
Allowances 
Social Protection Food subsidies, Targeted Safety Nets (e.g. Public 
works projects, Supplementary feeding, Income 
transfers) 
Social Services Care for the vulnerable groups (e.g. People with 
disabilities, Elderly people and Orphans) 
Social Rights Child labour, Women’s rights, Labour codes 
Source: Devereux & Cook (2000: 64). 
 
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that this scope in table 12 above is not linear in 
nature. When one is dealing with say social insurance, you will need also to provide the 
social services to speed up the process. The same will apply if one is dealing with social 
services or social protection. Education and health are paramount in making the process a 
success. A country which wants to get out of poverty must invest in its education, it must 
have a good health care system, and it must provide both for those who are in the formal and 
the informal sectors simultaneously.  
 
 Le Roux begins by asserting that social development should not be left to social policy 
alone, but that there must be involvement of economic policy as well.146 He warns that 
although a high rate of economic growth is desirable, prudence must be put where such a 
very high rate is not attained.147 It is clear that there is indeed a call for a radical change in the 
way social policy is being perceived in Southern Africa. He recognizes the need for having 
economic growth as long as there is a conducive environment for adopting appropriate social 
policies that match that growth. He evokes a dynamic way of thinking when he suggests that 
with globalisation we are not free to have a home grown social policy. As if this is not 
enough, he goes on to challenge us by posing a question to us: are we just going to accept the 
terms and conditions of World Bank and the IMF?148 This is a very provocative question in 
the sense that it wants to open our mind set into a new kind of debate.  
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Midgley & Hall begin by saying that “defining social policy is not as straight forward a task as it once 
seemed.” To them the term is full of ambiguity and uncertainty that it needs to be carefully set 
out and employed appropriately. They further come out with a strong voice saying that; “the 
time is ripe for a re-examination of social policy and its role in the development process”. Their main 
concern here is the tendency in recent times by policy makers and development experts to 
omit in the academic literature and in social policy circles terms such as poverty and 
inequality and go for social exclusion and capabilities. They unanimously condemn the 
exercise by saying that it is wrong due to the fact that the social evils of poverty and 
inequality that exist in communities are not addressed.149 
 
Mukandawire starts by alluding that research on social policy has lagged behind.150 He 
believes that social policy should not be engaged in only after attaining a certain development 
stage, nor is it exclusive to only advanced welfare states, but it is a key to economic and 
social development. He goes on to say that it is a moral obligation of all researchers to get 
involved in addressing poverty and global inequality. It is clear that there is a need now to 
undertake research in social policy in an African context.151 It is clear from the discussion 
above that countries are not doing enough, in most cases they wait until a particular stage of 
growth is attained and then start thinking of social policy. In Rwanda’s context instituting 
social policies should not be left only to the welfare states or just keep hoping for the best to 
come out of the Vision 2020.  It is worthwhile to adopt these ambitious plans like the UIG 
because the researcher believes that it will enable Rwanda attain its Vision 2020.  
 
For Adesina in his paper written for the workshop to look at social policy in a development 
context, held in Sweden, he begun by asserting the fact that it is essential to rethink social 
policy in Africa, and that there is also a need to return to a broader vision of social policy. His 
advice to us is: 
That we should move away from targeting and means-testing in 
social policy because it has not been developmental or 
improved social well-being and above all enhanced social 
cohesion. But rather, we should promote universal access 
because it has been developmental, it has improved social well-
being and it has also enhanced social cohesion. He goes on to 
say that universalism tends to secure wider social commitment 
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to the policy and that a state/citizen nexus based on mutual 
exchange of obligations and privileges has a greater chance of 
securing social stability which itself is valuable for sustained 
economic development.152 
 
It is clear from Adesina’s radical way of thinking that indeed things went wrong in Africa. In 
his view he suggests a total overhaul of the entire state machinery in Africa. This does ring a 
bell especially after all the wars and conflicts that have taken place on the African continent 
in the last century. It indeed culminated into the Rwandan genocide that claimed over one 
million people. So for Adesina, an appropriate social policy must be universal and not means-
tested because it is developmental, it improves social well-being and it also enhances social 
cohesion.  
 
Musahara in his PhD thesis informs us that the stocks of existing social policies for poverty 
reduction used in Rwanda are inappropriate. To him, none of these social policies can claim 
ability to target poverty in the developing world and definitely not in Rwanda. He is of the 
view that a country like Rwanda with its distorted past, as a result of its colonial legacy and 
then the 1994 genocide that claimed almost a million people, care must be taken while 
determining the appropriate social policy to put in place. He therefore advocates for a 
comprehensive social policy which has a universal targeting approach in order to alleviate the 
poverty-conflict trap in Rwanda.153 Although he advocates a universal targeting approach to 
deal with poverty, his call was for the adoption of a comprehensive social policy which does 
not only look at one remedy. However the researcher in this thesis is suggesting that for 
Rwanda to be able to attain its Vision 2020 in the remaining 12 years, a UIG needs to be 
adopted to reduce the inequalities that already exist and also to alleviate poverty.  
 
The reasons put forward by the different scholars are a clear indication that indeed there is a 
need to start identifying appropriate social policies that can help alleviate poverty. And above 
all that, the existing social policies have indeed failed to address the problem of mass poverty 
and the promotion of human welfare in the developing world.154  A universal targeting 
approach seems to be the best option in the case of Rwanda. This is why we have come out 
with a provocative question in this thesis, whether a UIG is appropriate to alleviate poverty in 
Rwanda. The next section is going to be a discussion on the trend of foreign aid in Rwanda. 
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3.5. Trends in Foreign Aid for Rwanda 
Why are we concerned with consulting the historical trends of foreign aid in Rwanda? The 
answer is purely to show that Rwanda has been depending on foreign aid for some time now. 
And it is therefore about time to devise mechanisms which could make the current aid more 
sustainable in the event that no more aid is given to Rwanda. In this thesis AID is defined as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA).155 It covers both the financial and non-financial 
components. These are flows of which the sources are the governments and official agencies 
of donor countries. Concessional aid also includes non-financial forms of assistance (such as 
grants of machinery or equipment as well as providing technical analysis, advice, and 
capacity-building).156 Such non-financial forms of aid are favoured by donors instead of cash 
transfers which we argue could be very vital for alleviating poverty.157 Rwanda has been 
depending on foreign aid for a long time. The figure 13 below represents the performance of 
foreign aid in Rwanda from 1973 to 2005. 
 
 
Figure 11: Performance of Foreign aid in Rwanda (1973-2005) 
Source: Adopted from the World Development Indicators, 2007 
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From figure 12 above it is clear that Rwanda has indeed benefited from foreign aid. But the 
question to be asked is, has this foreign aid been used properly, especially towards addressing 
the poverty issue? If you refer to table 13 below, it begins in 1960 up to 1972.158 It actually 
covers the first regime of Gregoire Kayibanda who is the first civilian president that Rwanda 
got after the monarchy was destroyed. It means that Rwanda starts off after independence in 
1962 getting foreign aid. Much of it was intended for capital formation. Foreign aid in terms 
of the Gross National Income (GNI) had very little contribution. It is illustrated by table 13 
below that from 1970 to 1972 aid as a percentage of GNI was undulating. It started with 6% 
in 1960, then 6% in 1961, 9% in 1962, 5% in 1963, 5% in 1964, 5% in 1965, 9% in 1966, 8% 
in 1967, 9% in 1968, 9% in 1969, 10% in 1970, 11% in 1971 and 12% in 1972 
 
Table 12: Aid performance in Rwanda from 1960-1972 
Year Aid(% of GNI) Aid(% of gross 
capital formation 
Aid(% of imports of 
goods and services) 
Aid per capita 
(Current US $) 
1960 6 104 - 3 
1961 6 90 - 2 
1962 9 108 - 4 
1963 5 65 - 2 
1964 5 58 - 2 
1965 5 52 2  
1966 9 94 - 3 
1967 8 110 - 4 
1968 9 114 - 5 
1969 9 141 - 5 
1970 10 140 - 6 
1971 11 123 - 6 
1972 12 128 - 7 
Source: Adopted from the World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
Table 14 below covers the period from 1973 to 1993.159 It considers the regime of Major 
General Habyarimana who took power after a coup d’etat in 1973. Foreign Aid as a 
percentage of GNI from 1973 to 1993 was also surging. In 1973 it was 13%, then 15% in 
1974, 16% in 1975, 12% in 1976, 12% in 1977,14% in 1978, 14% in 1979, 13% in 1980, 
12% in 1981, 11% in 1982, 10% in 1983, 10% in 1984, 10%in 1985, 11% in 1986, 11% in 
1987, 10% in 1988, 9% in 1989, 11% in 1990, 19% in 1991, 17% in 1992 and 18% in 1993. 
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 Refer also to figure 1. 
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Aid in terms of gross capital formation from 1973 up to 1979 was also rising and falling. It 
was 142% in 1973, 144% in 1974, 116% in 1975, 86% in 1976, 82% in 1977, 86% in 1978, 
118% in 1979, 82% in 1980, 87% in 1981, 60% in 1982, 73% in 1983, 65% in 1984, 59% in 
1985, 66% in 1986, 71% in 1987, 71% in 1988, 70% in 1989, 76% in 1990, 134% in 1991, 
110% in 1992 and 107% in 1993.  
 
From 1976 up to 1990 aid on the imports of goods and services in terms of percentage was 
also rising and falling.  It was 52% in 1976, 53% in 1977, 44% in 1978, 43% in 1979, 43% in 
1980, 42% in 1981, 43% in 1982, 46% in 1983, 50% in 1984, 50% in 1985, 48% in 1986, 
54% in 1987, 55% in 1988, 57% in 1989 90% in 1990 101% in 1991, 94% in 1992 and 84% 
in 1993.  
 
Aid per capita from 1973 up to 1993 was also rising and falling. It started from US$ 9  in 
1973, US$11 in 1974, US$20 in 1975, US$ 17 in 1976, US$ 20 in 1977,  US$ 26 in 1978, 
US$ 29 in 1979, US$ 30 in 1980, US$29 in 1981, US$27 in 1982, US$26 in 1983, US$ 28 in 
1984, US$ 29 in 1985, US$ 32 in 1986, US$ 36 in 1987, US$35 in 1988, US$32 in 1989, 
US$ 41 in 1990, US$ 53 in 1991, US$ 55 in 1992 and US$ 60 in 1993. 
 
Table 13: Aid performance in Rwanda from 1973-1993 
Year Aid(% of GNI) Aid(% of gross capital 
formation 
Aid(%of imports of goods 
and services) 
Aid per capita (Current 
US $) 
1973 13 142 - 9 
1974 15 144 - 11 
1975 16 116 - 20 
1976 12 86 52 17 
1977 12 82 53 20 
1978 14 86 44 26 
1979 14 118 43 29 
1980 13 82 43 30 
1981 12 87 42 29 
1982 11 60 43 27 
1983 10 73 46 26 
1984 10 65 50 28 
1985 10 59 50 29 
1986 11 66 48 32 
1987 11 71 54 36 
1988 10 71 55 35 
1989 9 70 57 32 
1990 11 76 77 41 
1991 19 134 101 53 
1992 17 110 94 55 
1993 18 107 84 60 
Source: Adopted from the World Development Indicators, 2007 
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Table 14: Aid performance in Rwanda from 1994-2005 
Year Aid(% of GNI) Aid(% of gross capital 
formation 
Aid(%of imports of 
goods and services) 
Aid per capita (Current 
US $) 
1994 95 946 95 129 
1995 53 401 178 128 
1996 34 234 120 82 
1997 13 90 46 37 
1998 18 119 80 51 
1999 19 112 81 50 
2000 18 101 71 40 
2001 18 95 64 36 
2002 21 121 77 41 
2003 20 108 71 38 
2004 27 130 80 55 
2005 27 119 82 64 
Source: Adopted from the World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
From 1994 this period is very important in the history of Rwanda in as far as aid and social 
policies are concerned. This is a time when a government of national unity was sworn in to 
try and correct past mistakes, rebuild and reconstruct Rwanda which had been devastated by 
the war and the 1994 genocide.160 We can therefore see that from 1997 up to 2005, Aid as a 
contribution of GNI in percentage terms was surging. It was 13% in 1997, 18% in 1998, 19% 
in 1999, 18% in 2000, 18% in 2001, 21% in 2002, 20% in 2003, 27% in 2004 and 27% in 
2005. Because this was an emergency period under reconstruction, aid in terms of Capital 
formation in percentage terms increased. It was 146% in 1994, 401% in 1995, 234% in 1996, 
90% in 1997, 119% in 1998, 112% in 1999, 101% in 2000, 95% in 2001, 121% in 2002, 
108% in 2003, 130% in 2004 and 119% in 2005. From 1995 to 1996 import of goods and 
services percentage terms was rising and falling. It was 95% in 1994, 178% in 1995, 120% in 
1996, 46% in 1997, 80% in 1998, 81% in 1999, 71% in 2000, 64% in 2001, 77% in 2002, 
71% in 2003, 80% in 2004 and 82% in 2005. Aid per capita from 1994 to 1995 was also 
rising and falling. It was US$%129 in 1994, US$128 in 1995, US$82 in 1996, US$37 in 
1997, US$51 in 1998, US$50 in 1999, US$40 in 2000, US$36 in 2001, US$41 in 
2002,US$38 in 2003, US$55 in 2004 and US$64 in 2005. See table 15 above for an 
illustration. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
The UIG debate dates back to 1516 from the time of Thomas Moore. But of course as the 
discourse suggests, this debate was participated in by scholars from different walks of life. 
There were economists, philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists. But the outstanding 
feature of all of them is that they concluded that targeting or means -tested approaches do not 
alleviate poverty effectively and consensus was developed to adopt a UIG grant that may be 
distributed to the entire population.  
 
During the 21st century, Van Parijs became very instrumental in the debate of a UIG. He went 
as far as defining it and setting standards that must be followed, for example that a UIG can 
only be possible in developed countries and not in a developing country due to lack of 
resources. 
 
However, Le Roux in his model of 2001 in the Taylor Commission came up with a counter 
argument that said that yes it is possible to have a UIG in middle-income countries like South 
Africa and Namibia. In his model he came up with a grant of R100 to be given to all citizens 
every month. He got support from COSATU, the Council of churches, and civil society, but 
never from the government. He advocated for a universal approach towards providing a 
lasting solution to unemployment, inequality and chronic poverty in South Africa. 
 
Rhee in her masters’ mini-thesis while trying to get answers to the prevailing social evils of 
high unemployment rates, high levels of inequalities and poverty, confirmed UIG is 
affordable today in South Africa and but she suggested that each individual in the household 
be given a monthly payment of R 125 instead of R100 that was suggested by Le Roux in his 
model of 2001. 
 
Although according to Le Roux a UIG is only possible in middle-income countries alone, it is 
also documented that there is a possibility of it working in low-income countries such as 
Mozambique and Rwanda. We found out that cash transfers were given out in Mozambique 
to demobilised soldiers and flood victims in 2000. Rwanda also has cash transfers under the 
Ubudehe161 participatory projects. It also gives cash transfers to the genocide survivors so 
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that they can pay for their tuition fees, buy uniforms, transport, clothes, and hospital, buy 
food and also be able to pay for electricity and water bills. You will realise that this social 
policy is targeted and not universal in nature.  
 
The amount of foreign aid that has and is still flowing in Rwanda, since 1960 up to today, we 
suggested appropriate measures of using the aid in a sustainable manner. Then we 
recommended that if a certain percentage of foreign aid (say 20%) was channelled directly to 
poverty alleviation and then recouped from the affluent by higher indirect taxes (VAT, luxury 
goods etc), then it would be possible to start instituting the UIG. 
 
This research intends to carry on with the work that was started by Musahara to show that 
indeed a UIG can be used to alleviate poverty in Rwanda and enable the country attain its 
Vision 2020 and the MDGs. The question is: whether UIG financed out of indirect tax 
increases (VAT, sales tax etc), and foreign aid is appropriate for poverty alleviation in 
Rwanda, This brings in a new phenomenon of channelling donor funding to poverty 
alleviation instead of the usual channel which is via the budget support or via projects. This 
approach has not been used by any of the proponents of the UIG in the developed or 
developing world or by those that consider the best use of foreign aid. 
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Chapter Four: Developing a micro- simulation model to measure the impact of a UIG in 
Rwanda 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the simulation model developed by Le Roux for South Africa and Namibia162 
is adapted to the Rwandan circumstances to show the impact of increasing VAT to what is 
assumed to be a maximum sustainable level and allocating the additional funds thus raised to 
pay for a universal income grant.  In order to enhance the level of the grant and to ensure that 
the increase in indirect taxes combined with a grant does not imply a net burden for those 
under the poverty line, the possibility is also investigated of allocating about a fifth of the 
present foreign aid to help pay for a universal grant.   
 
4.2. The assumptions of the model. 
In order to illustrate the impact of the proposed income grant financed out of an increase in 
indirect taxes, the households were grouped into ten groups or deciles, each containing an 
equal number of households, after being ranked according to their expenditure per household 
member. The data used for this purpose is from the Integrated Living Conditions Survey 
2005/06 (EICV 2) of December 2006 and the SPSS Data for 2005/06 that was obtained from 
the National Institute of Statistics (NISR) of Rwanda. 
 
For purposes of a simulation model, measuring the impact of paying a universal income grant 
from the funds raised by increasing VAT and other indirect taxes proportionally, estimation 
had to be made of what proportion of each decile’s expenditure was subject to VAT.  Since 
we know what the total VAT collected in 2007 was, and further also know that food stuffs 
and most of the goods the low- income groups purchase are exempted from VAT, an 
estimation of the proportion of goods on which VAT and other indirect taxes are paid by each 
decile, with the low income deciles paying very little VAT.  A number of simulations were 
run until the proportions estimated generated the total VAT collected in 2007.  
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VAT often has a regressive163 impact because of the fact that low-income households spend 
most of their income on consumption and this often results in them paying a larger 
percentage of their income in tax than the wealthiest households, who save a larger 
proportion of their income.164  However, this is not the case if the goods primarily purchased 
by the poor are excluded like the case is in Rwanda.165  Furthermore,  as we will show below, 
the net impact of an indirect tax increase combined with a universal grant financed by the tax 
increase is progressive, in that the poorest 8 deciles always benefits from such a redistribution 
of income. 
 
4.3. Static or dynamic model 
The model we are adopting in our simulation is a static model.  Two types of dynamic 
consequences of paying a UIG and increasing indirect taxes are ignored.  
 
Firstly, there may be a positive or negative macro-economic impact. Some have argued that 
because this redistributes income from the rich to the poor, it would in the end stimulate 
growth in GDP via a Keynesian multiplier. 166  Although under certain assumptions this could 
be shown to be the case, it is difficult to prove that these conditions pertain in Rwanda.  The 
opposite could also be argued.  The monetarists, for example would argue that such 
redistribution will eat into the savings of the higher income groups and that this will result in 
higher interest rates which would lead to lower investment.167  In this research any such 
dynamic impacts were ignored because they are difficult to estimate.  It is in any case, given 
the fact that only about 1% of the GDP is being distributed, quite possible  that no or 
insignificant negative or positive short- term macro-economic consequences will be observed 
because of such a  redistribution of income. 
 
 A second possible dynamic consequence is that the rich, because they are paying more net 
tax, may cut back on their consumption. This would mean that VAT and other indirect taxes 
might have to be increased by more than what we estimate in order to raise money to pay any 
given level of the grant. This would mean a higher increase in VAT and other indirect taxes 
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than assumed in the calculations here for a given grant, or a lower net benefit, and also lower 
the net burdens.  It may be counter-intuitive, but once one considers it carefully it is obvious 
that if one has to increase the indirect taxes by more because of a reduction in the 
consumption of those who are better off, this implies that everyone pays higher indirect taxes. 
As a consequence, for any given level of the grant, the net benefits are lower, as is the net 
burden.  
 
4.4. Assumption with regard to VAT increase 
As will be shown in all our calculations, the net impact of a VAT and other indirect tax 
increase as envisaged here combined with a UIG and a transfer of one fifth of foreign aid, is 
that 90% of the households have a net benefit and do not in fact in net terms pay more tax, 
with the benefit being bigger the lower household per capita expenditure is.  It is only the top 
decile of households that are worse off in this model.   
 
However, because the grant is not a negative expenditure tax, but paid out as a lump sum to 
everyone, while everyone also pays more indirect taxes, this means that there will be an 
inclination to avoid indirect taxes if pushed up too high.  It is difficult to know what the upper 
limit is to which VAT can be increased.  On advice of some of the members of the 
NAMTAX commission, it is here proposed that the maximum VAT should preferably not be 
higher than 25%, which means that it can only be increased by 7%. 
 
4.5. No foreign aid used for grant 
In the first instance we run a simulation in which we do not use foreign aid at all. However, 
we increased VAT by 7% and other indirect taxes proportionally.  The monthly per person 
UIG which could be funded by this increase amounts to Rwf 432 (or USD$ 0.74 a month at 
2007 exchange rates). It should be noted, that such a UIG is very low.  This is the case 
because; in contrast to South Africa and Namibia (where VAT increases of even lower than 
7% could finance UIG’s of respectively SAR100 and N$70) there are not enough people with 
high income in Rwanda to finance a significant grant to all.168  See table 17 for an illustration. 
 
As a result it was decided to investigate the possibility of using a proportion of foreign aid for 
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the grant, after first having implemented an indirect tax increases, to thus ensure that the foreign aid is targeted to benefit the poor and not the 
better-off. 
 
If one should bring down the VAT increase dramatically to only 3.5% tax as illustrated in table 15 below, one can only finance a UIG of Rwf 
213 which is equivalent to US$0.36 or US$0.89 in terms of PPP.  It should be noted that in this case the bottom 8 deciles are all better off but 
those households in the top decile are worse off paying on average a net annual tax of Rwf 14 .431. While the average households in the 9th 
decile pays a net annual tax increase of Rwf 1.726. As a consequence the household with an average per capita income in the ninth decile, in 
spite of it being under the poverty line, still is worse off by about 1 %. See table 15 and figures 12a, b & c below for a clear illustration of what 
the impact is in terms of benefit and cost as a result of bringing down the VAT dramatically to 3.5% tax. 
 
Table 15: Benefit and cost of a monthly income grant of Rwf 213 combined with an increase in VAT of 3.5% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but with zero foreign aid. 
HH 
Decile Population 
HH Per 
Person 
expenditure 
maximum 
HH Per 
person 
expenditure 
Average 
Vatable 
expenditure 
Annual 
Grant 
Rwf 
(billions) 
Per 
capita 
Grant 
Indirect 
tax Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
indirect 
tax 
Additional 
VAT &other 
indirect taxes 
Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
Additional 
VAT &other 
indirect taxes 
Net 
benefit/loss 
Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
Net 
benefit/loss  
1 1.10 25489 18362 0.086 2.827 2562 0.445 404 0.161 146 2.666 2416   
2 1.09 34981 30281 0.086 2.780 2562 0.722 666 0.213 197 2.567 2365   
3 1.02 44079 39407 0.086 2.621 2562 0.886 866 0.241 236 2.380 2326   
4 1.00 54286 49112 0.08689 2.573 2562 1.096 1091 0.281 280 2.292 2282   
5 0.99 65610 59788 0.121834 2.537 2562 1.844 1862 0.453 457 2.084 2104   
6 98 79311 72363 0.179002 2.504 2562 3.236 3310 0.766 784 1.738 1778   
7 0.93 98572 88097 0.258678 2.392 2562 5.437 5824 1.246 1335 1.146 1227   
8 0.93 131867 113331 0.361722 2.389 2562 9.769 10476 2.163 2320 0.225 242 13.509 Net Benefit 
9 0.92 207779 162596 0.483866 2.359 2562 18.514 20106 3.948 4288 -1.589 -1726 -13.509 Net  tax  ollected 
10 0.94 14042339 495255 0.67 2.398 2562 79.288 84702 15.907 16993 -13.509 -14431 0.000 Total  foreign aid 
  
9.91       25.380  121.237 129.306 25.380 27.035 
      
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Figure 12 The Total annual net costs of the grant per decile of a Rwf 213 grant per person combined with an 
increase in VAT of 3.5% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but with zero foreign aid. 
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Figure 12 above shows the annual grant per decile in terms of benefit and cost. As it is 
illustrated by the graph, the lower deciles benefit more than the higher deciles from the grant.  
The reason for this is that the number of people per household decreases from the 1st to the 9th 
decile.  In the case of the 10th there is an increase in the household size over that of the 9th 
decile.  
 
 
Figure 13 The total additional indirect taxes paid per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 213 combined with an 
increase in VAT of 3.5% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but with zero foreign aid. 
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Figure 13 again shows the  additional VAT and other indirect taxes paid per deciles. The 
higher deciles are contributing much more than the lower deciles because of the fact that their 
expenditure is much higher. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 The net benefit or cost per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 213 combined with an increase in VAT of 
3.5% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but with zero foreign aid. 
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the Net Benefit/Loss incurred as a result of redistributing the Universal 
grant. It is clear from the graph that from the first decile to the eigth decile, they receive a 
benefit. However, from the ninth and the tenth decile, there is a loss that is experienced. 
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Table 16: The Net impact of an increase in VAT of 3.5% (and a proportional increase in other indirect 
taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 213 illustrated in dollar terms but with Zero Foreign Aid. 
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
In terms of daily PPP US$ per person net benefit, the scenario is that households in the first 
seven deciles attain a net benefit varying from 1c to 3c at PPP per person a day. Households 
in the top two deciles respectively make a net contribution of 2c and 16c at PPP per person a 
day. 
 
 
 
House Hold 
Deciles 
Daily US$ per person 
expenditure at PPP 
Daily US$ per 
person after benefit 
Daily US$ per 
person net benefit 
at PPP 
Percentage increase in per  
person  expenditure: 
Grant 
1 0.21 0.24 0.03 13% 
2 0.34 0.37 0.03 8% 
3 0.45 0.47 0.03 6% 
4 0.56 0.58 0.03 5% 
5 0.68 0.70 0.02 4% 
6 0.82 0.84 0.02 2% 
7 1.00 1.02 0.01 1% 
8 1.29 1.29 0.00 0% 
9 1.85 1.83 -0.02 -1% 
10 5.63 5.46 -0.16 -3% 
Average 0.75 0.75 0.00 0% 
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Figure 15  The percentage increase or decrease in per person expenditure caused by an increase in VAT of 
3.5% (and a proportional increase in other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 213 illustrated in dollar terms 
but with Zero Foreign Aid. 
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
We can see from the table 16 and figure 15 above that a grant of Rwf 213 has a positive 
impact on the poorest six households. It increases the expenditure of the poorest decile by 
13% while imposing a net tax burden on households in the top decile of 3%. See figure 15 
above for an illustration.  
 
Table 17 below shows that if VAT is increased by 7% and all other indirect taxes 
proportionally, it is possible to finance a monthly UIG of Rwf 432, which is equal to US$ 0, 
74 in exchange rate terms.  The net benefits paid out and the net additional tax imposed will 
balance each other at a total of Rwf 30.37 billion.   In this scenario the bottom 8 deciles are 
all better off, but all the households in the top decile are worse off paying on average a net 
annual tax of about Rwf 29,000.   
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The average household in the 9th decile pays a net annual tax of Rwf 3522. At first glance this seems to be a good outcome – all of the 
households in the top decile and the average household in the second richest decile are worse off, but everyone else is better off.   However, we 
are in fact also taxing households in the 9th decile who on average have incomes below US$2169 in terms of PPP170 a day 
 
Table 17: Benefit and cost of a monthly income grant of Rwf 432 combined with an increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but 
with zero foreign aid. 
HH 
Deciles Population 
HH Per 
Person 
expenditure 
maximum 
HH Per 
person 
expenditure 
Average 
Vatable 
expenditure 
Annual 
Grant 
Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
Grant 
Indirect 
tax Rwf 
(billions) 
Per 
capita 
indirect 
tax 
Additional 
VAT &other 
indirect taxes 
Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
Additional 
VAT 
&other 
indirect 
taxes 
Net 
benefit/loss 
Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
Net 
benefit/loss  
1 1.10 25489 18362 0.086 5.725 5188 0.445 404 0.348 315 5.377 4873  
2 1.09 34981 30281 0.086 5.631 5188 0.722 666 0.453 417 5.178 4771  
3 1.02 44079 39407 0.086 5.309 5188 0.886 866 0.507 495 4.802 4693  
4 1.00 54286 49112 0.08689 5.212 5188 1.096 1091 0.587 584 4.625 4604  
5 0.99 65610 59788 0.121834 5.138 5188 1.844 1862 0.939 948 4.199 4240  
6 0.98 79311 72363 0.179002 5.072 5188 3.236 3310 1.581 1617 3.491 3571  
7 0.93 98572 88097 0.258678 4.844 5188 5.437 5824 2.559 2741 2.284 2447  
8 0.93 131867 113331 0.361722 4.838 5188 9.769 10476 4.420 4740 0.418 448  
9 0.92 207779 162596 0.483866 4.777 5188 18.514 20106 8.020 8710 -3.243 -3522 30.374 Net  Benefit 
10 0.94 14042339 495255 0.67 4.856 5188 79.288 84702 31.988 34172 -27.132 -28984 -30.375 Net tax  collected 
 9.91   51.401  121.237 129.306 51.402 54.741    
Source: Own Calculations. 
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The figures below (figure 16,17,18,19 & 20) shows the benefit and costs of a UIG of Rwf 
432 combined with an increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and 
levies but with zero foreign aid as in table 17 above. The first five deciles pay very little VAT 
and other indirect taxes. As a consequence their net benefit is quite high. Then from the 8th, 
9th and 10th deciles, their contribution towards VAT and other indirect taxes is high. 
However, the tax burden is felt only by the 9th and 10th deciles.  
 
 
Figure 16 The net benefit or cost per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 combined with an increase in VAT of 7% 
and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but with zero foreign aid. 
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Figure 17 below shows the annual grant per decile in terms of benefit and cost. Again as it is 
illustrated by the graph, the lower deciles benefit more than the higher deciles from the grant.  
The reason for this still is the fact that the number of people per household decreases from the 
1st to the 9th decile.  In the case of the 10th there is an increase in the household size over that 
of the 9th decile.  
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Figure 17 The Total annual net costs of the grant per decile of a Rwf 432 grant per person 
combined with an increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies 
but with zero foreign aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Figure 18 below shows the  indirect tax paid per deciles in billions. The higher deciles are 
contributing much more than the lower deciles because of the fact that their expenditure is 
much higher. 
 
 
Figure 18 The total indirect taxes paid per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 combined with 
an increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but with zero 
foreign aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Figure 19 below shows the  additional VAT and other indirect taxes paid per deciles in 
billions. The higher deciles are contributing much more than the lower deciles because of the 
fact that their expenditure is much higher. 
 
 
Figure 19 The total additional indirect taxes paid per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 
combined with an increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies 
but with zero foreign aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
 
Figure 20 below illustrates the Net Benefit/Loss incurred as a result of redistributing the 
Universal grant of Rwf 432. It is clear from the graph that from the 1st decile to the 8th decile, 
they receive a benefit. However, from the 9th and the 10th decile, there is a loss that is 
experienced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
81 
 
Figure 20 The net benefit or cost per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 combined with an 
increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but with zero foreign 
aid.  
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
 
In Table 18 below, the net impact of an increase in VAT of 7% (and a proportional increase 
in other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 is shown in dollar terms.   In exchange 
rate terms a UIG of Rwf 432 is merely US$ 0.74 per month.  However, in terms of 
Purchasing Power Parity this grant is equal to US$ 1.79 per month.  Thus even in terms of 
PPP the UIG per month that can be afforded if we increase VAT by 7% and other indirect 
taxes proportionally is very low.  Because per capita expenditure is so low, this very modest 
UIG nevertheless has a significant impact on the per capita expenditure of the bottom 7 
deciles, increasing the monthly per capita expenditure in PPP terms of the poorest decile by 
an average of 27%.  On the other hand the members of the richest decile pay on average a net 
tax of 6%.  
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Table 18: The Net impact of an increase in VAT of 7% (and a proportional increase in other indirect 
taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 illustrated in dollar terms but with Zero Foreign Aid. 
House Hold 
Deciles 
Daily US$ per 
person expenditure 
at PPP 
Daily US$ per 
person after 
benefit 
Daily US$ per 
person net 
benefit PPP 
Percentage increase in 
per person  
expenditure: Grant 
1 0.21 0.26 0.06 27% 
2 0.34 0.40 0.05 16% 
3 0.45 0.50 0.05 12% 
4 0.56 0.61 0.05 9% 
5 0.68 0.73 0.05 7% 
6 0.82 0.86 0.04 5% 
7 1.00 1.03 0.03 3% 
8 1.29 1.29 0.01 0% 
9 1.85 1.81 -0.04 -2% 
10 5.63 5.30 -0.33 -6% 
Average 0.75 0.75 0.00 0% 
 
    
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
 
Although the impact of this grant is not dramatic, one may at first glance argue that it is 
nevertheless an improvement in income distribution.  However, it comes at a price for some 
of the poor, for in this scenario the average household in the 9th decile with an income of only 
US$0.76 at exchange rate or US$1.85 at PPP is also taxed.  Although a VAT increase of 7% 
thus seemed feasible a priori, this is an increase which will tax households who are already 
considered to be under the poverty line.  
 
Figures 21 & 22 below demonstrates the dynamics that we have just discussed above in table 
18 confirming the fact that at a grant of Rwf432, we shall be taxing households that are below 
US$ 2 and are already below the poverty line. What is visible though is the fact that the 1st to 
the 8th deciles experience a benefit from the grant of Rwf 432, while the 9th and 10th deciles 
bear the cost because they have a higher expenditure. 
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Figure 21 The net benefit of cost of an increase in VAT of 7% (and a proportional increase in 
other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 illustrated in dollar terms, with Zero 
Foreign Aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
 
We can see from the table 18 above and figure 22 below that a grant of Rwf 432 has a 
positive impact on the poorest six households. It increases the expenditure of the poorest 
decile by 27% while imposing a net tax burden on households in the top decile of 6%. See 
figure 22 below for an illustration.  
 
 
 
Figure 22 The percentage increase or decrease in per person expenditure caused by an increase in VAT of 7% 
(and a proportional increase in other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 432 with Zero Foreign Aid 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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If one in addition considers that there will inevitably be some costs in distributing the UIG, 
there are clearly strong arguments against a UIG financed only by increasing the indirect 
taxes in a country such as Rwanda.  However, would this option become realistic if one also 
uses a proportion of the Foreign Aid for the UIG?  
 
4.6. Proportion of Foreign Aid used for grant. 
In this second instance, we run a simulation in which we tried to fund a grant of Rwf 1,200 
by also drawing on part of the foreign aid.  Table 19 below shows that if VAT is increased by 
7% and all other indirect taxes proportionally, and 21% of the foreign aid is allocated for the 
grant, it is possible to finance a monthly UIG at the level of Rwf 1200, which is equal to US$ 
2.05 at the exchange rate or US$ 4.98 at PPP.  The net benefits paid out will be equal to Rwf 
104.271 billion and the net additional indirect tax imposed will be Rwf 20.557 billion. If one 
adds the amount of foreign aid of Rwf 83.715 billions, then the grant is fully paid for. In this 
scenario all those in the poorest bottom 9 deciles are made better off while those in the top 
decile are made worse off , paying on average a net annual tax of about Rwf 22,000 which is 
equivalent to US$ 37.61.  
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Table 19: Benefit and cost of a monthly income grant of Rwf 1200 combined with an increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies but 
with 21% foreign aid. 
HH 
Deciles Population 
HH Per 
Person 
expenditure 
maximum 
HH Per person 
expenditure 
Average 
Vatable 
expenditure 
Annual 
Grant Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
Grant 
Indirect tax 
Rwf 
(billions) 
Per capita 
indirect tax 
Additional 
VAT &other 
indirect taxes 
Rwf (billions) 
Per capita 
Additional 
VAT &other 
indirect taxes 
Net 
benefit/loss 
Rwf (billions) Per capita Net benefit/loss  
1 1.10 25489 18362 0.086 15.891 14400 0.445 404 0.658 597 15.233 13803  
2 1.09 34981 30281 0.086 15.629 14400 0.722 666 0.758 698 14.871 13702  
3 1.02 44079 39407 0.086 14.734 14400 0.886 866 0.794 776 13.940 13624  
4 1.00 54286 49112 0.08689 14.465 14400 1.096 1091 0.872 868 13.593 13532  
5 0.99 65610 59788 0.121834 14.262 14400 1.844 1862 1.334 1347 12.928 13053  
6 0.98 79311 72363 0.179002 14.078 14400 3.236 3310 2.153 2202 11.925 12198  
7 0.93 98572 88097 0.258678 13.444 14400 5.437 5824 3.349 3587 10.095 10813  
8 0.93 131867 113331 0.361722 13.427 14400 9.769 10476 5.523 5923 7.904 8477 104.271 Net  Benefit 
9 0.92 207779 162596 0.483866 13.260 14400 18.514 20106 9.477 10292 3.783 4108 
 
-20.557 Net  tax collected 
10 0.94 14042339 495255 0.67 13.480 14400 79.288 84702 34.036 36360 -20.557 -21960 
 
83.715 (21%)  Total foreign  
aid 
 9.91    142.669  121.237 129.306 58.955 62.651    
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Figures (23,24,25,26 & 27) below are an illustration of what was calculated in Table 19 above. 
They demonstrate what happens on average in each decile when a grant of Rwf 1200 is 
introduced and funded by increasing VAT by 7% and other indirect taxes proportionally and 
paying the shortfall out of foreign aid.  
 
Figure 23 below shows the annual grant per decile in terms of benefit and cost. As it is illustrated 
by the graph, it is clear that the lower deciles benefit more than the higher deciles from the grant.  
The main reason for this is that the number of people per household decreases from the 1st to the 
9th decile.  In the case of the 10th decile, there is an increase in the household size over that of the 
9th decile.  
 
 
Figure 23 Annual grant paid per decile when a UIG of Rwf 1200 is combined with an increase in VAT of 7% and a 
proportionate increase in excise and levies and using 21% of foreign aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
 
Figure 24 below shows the  indirect tax paid per deciles in billions. The higher deciles are 
contributing much more than the lower deciles because of the fact that their expenditure is much 
higher. 
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Figure 24 The total indirect taxes paid per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 1200 is combined with 
an increase in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies  using  21% of  
foreign aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Figure 25 below shows the  additional VAT and other indirect taxes paid per deciles in billions. 
The higher deciles are contributing much more than the lower deciles because of the fact that 
their expenditure is much higher. 
 
 
Figure 25  The total additional indirect taxes paid per decile of a monthly UIG of Rwf 1200 combined with an increase 
in VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies using 21% of foreign aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Figure 26 below illustrates the Net Benefit/Loss incurred in billions as a result of redistributing 
the Universal grant of Rwf 1200. It is interesting to note this time though that from the graph that 
from the 1st decile to the 9th decile, they receive a benefit. However, there is a tax burden that is 
experienced by the 10th decile.  
 
 
Figure 26 Net annual benefit or cost per decile of a monthly income grant of Rwf 1200 combined with an increase in 
VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in excise and levies using 21% of foreign aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
As can be seen from Table 20 below, in Purchasing Power Parity terms, the average daily net tax 
in the 10th decile pay amounts to 0.25c (US$) per person, which is an average expenditure tax of 
4.4%.  In this scenario we seem to have a desirable outcome because all the households in the 9th 
deciles with an average income of less than US$2 per day are made better off and it is only the 
households in the 10th decile who have to bear the tax burden.  
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Table 20: The Net impact of an increase in VAT of 7% (and a proportional increase in other indirect taxes) 
and a monthly UIG of Rwf 1200 illustrated in dollar terms with 21% Foreign Aid. 
House Hold 
Deciles 
Daily US$ per person 
expenditure at PPP 
Daily US$ per 
person after benefit 
 
Daily US$ per 
person net benefit  
at PPP 
 
Percentage increase in per 
person  expenditure: 
Grant 
 
1 0.21 0.37 0.16 75% 
2 0.34 0.50 0.16 45% 
3 0.45 0.60 0.15 35% 
4 0.56 0.71 0.15 28% 
5 0.68 0.83 0.15 22% 
6 0.82 0.96 0.14 17% 
7 1.00 1.12 0.12 12% 
8 1.29 1.38 0.10 7.5% 
9 1.85 1.89 0.05 2.5% 
10 5.63 5.38 -0.25 -4.4% 
Average 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.0% 
 
 
 
  
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
In table 20 above, the net impact of an increase in VAT of 7% (and a proportional increase in 
other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 1200 is shown in dollar terms.   In exchange rate 
terms a UIG of Rwf 1200 is equivalent to US$ 2.05 per month. In terms of Purchasing Power 
Parity this grant is equal to US$ 4.98 or virtually $5 per month.  In terms of PPP the UIG per 
month that can be afforded if we increase VAT by 7% and other indirect taxes proportionally is 
significant.  And because the per capita expenditure of the poor is so low, this has a significant 
impact on the per capita expenditure of the bottom 6 deciles, increasing the monthly per capita 
expenditure in PPP terms of the poorest decile by an average of 75%. This is a meaningful 
impact especially if we are talking of getting people out of poverty and destitution. For those in 
the 7th, 8th and 9th deciles, though the impact is low, these households still benefit from the UIG 
and the households in the richest decile pays on average a net tax of 4.4%.  It is also clear that in 
terms of PPP the 10th decile all have an income which is above US$2 (US$2.32).  One thus taxes 
the relatively well off, and everyone else benefits. See figures 27, 28, 29 &30 for an illustration. 
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Figure 27 The daily US$ per person expenditure with an increase in VAT of 7% (and a 
proportional increase in other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 1200 illustrated in dollar 
terms and using 21% of Foreign Aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28 The daily US$ per person after benefit with an increase in VAT of 7% (and a 
proportional increase in other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 1200 illustrated in dollar 
terms and using 21% of Foreign Aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Figure 29 The net benefit or cost of an increase in VAT of 7% (and a proportional increase in other 
indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 1200 illustrated in dollar terms, and using 21% of 
Foreign Aid  
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
 
Figure 30 The percentage increase or decrease in per person expenditure caused by an increase 
in VAT of 7% (and a proportional increase in other indirect taxes) and a monthly UIG of Rwf 
1200 illustrated in dollar terms and using 21% of Foreign Aid. 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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We can see from the table 20 above and figure 30 above that a grant of Rwf 1200 has a positive 
impact on the poorest six households. It increases the expenditure of the poorest decile by 75% 
while imposing a net tax burden on households i n the top decile of 4.4%. See figure 30 above 
for an illustration.  
 
In figures (27, 28, 29 &30) above, we see that in terms of increases in US$ PPP expenditure, the 
first nine deciles benefited from the UIG and then the 10th decile got a negative net impact 
because they bear all the net loss. The grant is thus able to better the lives of all those in poverty 
and destitution when partly financed out of foreign aid. This is the reason why we recommended 
this option.  
 
It should be noted however that for all this to be attained, the tax system in the country must be 
efficient and effective in terms of its tax collection. Is it the case with the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority? 
 
4.7. Revenue Performance in Rwanda 
There are challenges in the implementation of an efficient VAT system in Rwanda as mentioned 
by Ntibanyurwa in her master’s thesis171 in 2001 and these are still present today. But by this it is 
not implied that there are no improvements in the tax system, since its inception in 2001. See 
table 21 below. 
 
It is clear that there has been a great improvement in the revenue collection despite the 
challenges. Table 22 below shows that the tax collected in 2004 was 136.2 billion, then in 2005 it 
increased to 183.96 billion (increase of 35%) and in 2006 it rose to 204.9 billion (increase of 
50% on 2004). What this means is that the Rwandan tax system has a potential to collect more 
revenue as long as the challenges are addressed. See also table 24 which shows the sources of 
revenue for 2007 and the data we used in this thesis for the purposes of running the simulations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
171
 Ntibanyurwa (2001). 
 
 
 
 
  
93
Table 21: Challenges encountered by Rwanda Revenue Authority 
High energy prices affected business performance and necessitated Government subsidization on petroleum 
products 
Poor record keeping especially amongst the medium and small tax payers 
Low compliance levels has persisted 
Smuggling and other forms of tax evasion 
Retaining competent staff 
Big and growing informal sector 
Continuous modernization of the processes and procedures 
Continuous capacity building 
Sustaining the information technology systems 
Initiating the innovative ways of reforming and modernizing the tax system 
Investing in human resource reorganization and development 
Building both regional and local partnership with various stakeholders and taxpayer groups 
Source: Adopted from Annual Reports (2004, 2005 &2006) of the Rwanda Revenue Authority. See also (www.rra.gov.rw  
 
Table 22:  Official tax collected from 2004 -2007 
Year Amount of Revenue collected in Rwf (billions) 
2007 252.6 
2006 204.9 
2005 183.96 
2004 136.2 
Source: Annual Reports (2004, 2005 &2006) from the Rwanda Revenue Authority. www.rra.gov.rw 
 
It is clear from table 23 below that although the tax base is still small, the contribution of tax on 
goods and services on total revenue has been impressive despite the fall which could be 
attributed to several fact ors as elaborated in table 21. In 2004 the contribution was 52.1 percent, 
and then in 2005 it was 51.3 percent. In 2006 it dropped to 48.6 percent and in 2007 it dropped 
further to 48.3 percent. 
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Table 23: Contribution of Tax on Goods and Services on Total Revenue collection from 
2004-2007 
Year Percentage contribution on Total Revenue 
2007 48.3% 
2006 48.6% 
2005 51.3% 
2004 52.1% 
Source: Rwanda Revenue Authority Annual Reports of (2004, 2005, 2006) (www.rra.gov.rw & MINECOFIN Annual 
Performance Report, (2007).172 
 
 
 
Table 24: Revenue sources in Rwanda in 2007 
Total Tax Revenue Rwf-
121,087,000.000 
Rand-173 
2,233,249,723 
VAT 85,286,000,000 1,572,962,006 
On Imports 36,010,000,000 664,146,0471 
On Domestic 49,276,000,000 908,815,935 
Excises 29,524,800,000 544,537,071 
On Imports 8, 909,400,000 164,319,439 
On Domestic 20,615,400,000 380,217,632 
Road Fund 6,276,000,000 115,750,646 
Source: Rwanda Revenue Authority (www.rra.gov.rw) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
172
 Republic of Rwanda (2005). Annual Report 2004. Rwanda Revenue Authority, 
Republic of Rwanda (2006). Annual Report 2005. Rwanda Revenue Authority, Republic of Rwanda (2007). Annual 
Report 2006. Rwanda Revenue Authority, Republic of Rwanda (2007). MINECOFIN ANNUAL PERFORMANCE 
REPORT. 
 
173
 To get this column I used the exchange rate from BNR of R1 is equal to Rwf 54.22 in 2008 prices. See: 
http://www.bnr.rw (accessed on 19/11/2008). 
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4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has tried to develop a micro-simulation model for Rwanda using household deciles 
as opposed to household quintiles that were used by Musahara when he was investigating the 
viability of a UIG in Rwanda.  
 
In the first simulation where a monthly grant of Rwf 432 was introduced, was an increase in 
VAT of 7% and a proportionate increase in other indirect taxes were required to finance this 
grant. In this case it was assumed that there was no foreign aid. The results of the simulation 
indicated that much as the poor are made better off and the rich bear the tax burden, even the 
relatively rich, it is those in the 9th decile, who are expected to help finance this grant are 
themselves below the poverty line.174 In terms of PPP, the bottom decile experienced a net 
benefit from the grant of 27% while the top decile had to pay a net tax of 6%. This net impact of 
this policy change was thus desirable.  When we reduce VAT to 3.5% which meant that we 
could only finance a grant of Rwf 213, it made matters even worse for those in the 9th decile 
 
This is why we opted for the second simulation where we could finance a grant of Rwf 1200 by 
also using 21% of foreign aid for the grant. The impact here was very positive. The bottom 
decile could increase their expenditure by 75% and the top decile incurred a tax burden of 4.4%, 
whereas those in the 9th decile were not worse off. Those in the top decile is above the poverty 
line having an expenditure at the very least of above US$2, and on average well above that. 
 
It was shown by the simulation that the net benefit for the poor was high. In the case of the 
affluent, because they contribute most to VAT and other indirect taxes as a result of their 
relatively high level of expenditure, they suffer a net loss (in that, in spite of the also getting the 
grant, they have an additional tax burden significantly higher than the grant). 
 
Whether a UIG will stimulate the economy on a macro level, is a contentious issue. However it 
is likely that this grant will stimulate the rural economy, where there will now be a greater 
demand from the poor who have more to spend.175 And this supports one of the flagships of the 
                                                 
174
 They were earning less than US$2. 
175
 See Le Roux (2002:31). 
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EDPRS, the Vision 2020 Umurenge because it advocates for integrated rural development 
programmes to eradicate extreme poverty and release the productive capacities of the poor.176 
This should enhance confidence in the government by the people, the investors and the workers 
because it will be addressing their concerns.177  It is clear that growth has favoured the better off 
from the 2000/01 to 2005/06 Living Household Survey. There is therefore a need to ensure that 
this growth also benefits the poor.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176
 IMF country Report (2008:i); Republic of Rwanda (2007). 
177
 Le Roux (2002:31). 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
The researcher in this dissertation showed the possible impact of a universal income grant (BIG) 
in alleviating poverty in Rwanda. He considered how a part of the existing foreign aid may be 
channelled into a UIG, with the funding effectively being recouped from those who do need 
support by an increase in the indirect taxes, e.g. in VAT. He developed a micro-simulation model 
which showed the impact of the combination a UIG, partly financed out of foreign aid and partly 
by increases in indirect taxes, on poverty and income distribution in Rwanda.  
 
The literature review revealed that a UIG, if successfully implemented, has the potential to 
restore the social capital that was destroyed by the genocide in 1994, stimulate aggregate 
spending, increase economic activity, bring investor confidence, promote economic growth and 
job creation and consequently would lead to poverty alleviation.  
 
This thesis has provided a platform for policy makers, non-governmental organisations, 
multilateral organisations, governments and the scholars that it is possible to adopt a UIG even in 
low-income countries as long as their country dynamics are clearly understood.  
 
This chapter presents a summary for the findings of this study. It is then considered whether the 
stipulated aims were attained. The chapter is concluded by a summary of some of the 
recommendations. 
 
5.2 Concluding Summary 
The thesis begun by looking at Poverty and the extent to which it has persistently not been able 
to be contained. Based on the existing literature, it is evident that poverty is still rampant in 
Rwanda though there is a slight reduction from 60 to 57 percent, as shown in the 2000/01-
2005/06 households living conditions survey. However, the most disquieting feature is the fact 
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that in spite of this reduction in poverty level the total numbers of people living in poverty 
increased from 4.8 in 2000/01 to 5.4 in 2005/06. 
 
As far as poverty alleviation is concerned, a number of social policies have been adopted in 
Rwanda but all have failed to address the poverty issue once and for all. It was observed that 
Rwanda preferred pursuing an approach which targets certain groups, such as the genocide 
survivors, child-headed households, widows and orphans as opposed to a universal grant, 
which if combined with indirect  tax increases targets all the poor.  
 
The literature also shows that in middle-income countries the rich are able to fund the grant. This 
was argued clearly in the Taylor commission report where scholars such as Le Roux came out 
strongly to say that due to the inequalities that existed, a universal income grant (BIG) would be 
the remedy for destitution.178 
 
The literature from the developed countries puts emphasis on provision of basic services. This 
approach has its own limitations because it is very expensive and has a lot of administrative costs 
as a result of trying to identify the basic needs of each individual in a household. It is also means-
tested in nature which renders it inept of dealing with poverty and destitution. 
 
The concept of what is an appropriate social policy was shown to be controversial. This was 
clear in the literature where every scholar came up with his/her definition of social policy. It 
could be argued that may be this marked the beginning of its failure in addressing issues of 
poverty and inequality. Of course, different modes of social production did exist both in Europe 
and Africa. But the most common factor was the involvement of the family, the church and the 
monarchy, when it came to dealing with the poor in the society. Probably one could put the 
blame for the dismantling of the ori ginal social policy on decomodification.179  
 
                                                 
178
 Le Roux (2001). 
179
 Esping-Andersen, G. (1990:13). 
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The thesis has its foundation in development studies and it is because of this that research in 
social policy and poverty had to be pursued due to the fact that they are pertinent issues as far as 
development studies are concerned.   
 
The debates surrounding a UIG as is shown in the literature review clearly have their origins in 
developed countries. However this does not mean that developing countries did not have ways of 
looking after their own poor. There is agreement that both in Europe and Africa, families, 
churches and the monarchy played a vital role in getting people out of poverty and destitution. It 
should be noted however that scholars in the developing countries have failed social and 
economic development because they are so locked up in disagreeing on which ideological trend 
to follow at the expense of development. It is indeed very important if one wants to try and adopt 
any social policy that they feel may get populations out of poverty, create jobs and in the end 
bring economic growth to be mindful of the existing ideologies and their impact. 
 
Apart from the issue of ideology, there is also the view that a UIG could work in middle –income 
countries but cannot work in low-income countries. Well, this thesis has tried to show that it is 
possible to introduce a UIG even in low-income countries. This was done using the micro- 
simulation model and the potential of the UIG was visible because the poor were made better off 
by redistributing from the affluent, and also drawing on one fifth of the available foreign aid.  
 
Rwanda after the 1994 genocide proposed a very ambitious plan to get out of the low-income 
bracket and rise up the ladder to the middle-income countries. However it’s Vision 2020 cannot 
be attained if emphasis is just on growth at the expense of the poor. It is from this background 
that the researcher has come out very strongly with the argument that it is possible to adopt the 
UIG especially if it is to facilitate Rwanda achieve the per capita income of $900.  
 
The aims of this research were achieved in as far as this thesis is concerned. This was done by 
the micro-simulation model that was presented in chapter four. It is clear that a UIG has the 
potential to alleviate poverty because of the fact that it is the poor households that gain from the 
grant because they spend less and the affluent bear the increase tax burden, because they spend 
more.  It was also shown by the simulations that when one uses no foreign aid, a 7% increase in 
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VAT and a proportional increase in other indirect taxes can finance a grant of Rwf 432, with, 
most of the poor benefiting but those in the 9th decile, because they are spending less than a 
dollar a day, are below the poverty line but nevertheless have to bear the net burden of the tax. If 
one reduces VAT to 3.5%, and still no foreign aid, the grant amount that can be financed will be 
as low as Rwf 213. When we introduced foreign aid was added into the simulation, a grant of 
Rwf 1200 could be financed and all those in the bottom 9 deciles were made better off.  It was 
only those in the 10th decile that experiences a net burden. This option was therefore 
recommended. 
 
5.3. Recommendations  
Rwanda needs to be able to achieve its Vision 2020 so that it can move from a low-income into a 
middle-income country swiftly. However for this to happen it has to have a growth rate of 7 
percent and a per capita income of $900 per annum,  
 
The researcher made the following recommendations: 
• In order for Rwanda to achieve sustainable growth, it must allow redistributive justice to 
prevail and actively enhance the trickle-down process by introducing a UIG. This will 
enable the growth to be translated into poverty alleviation. 
• Policy makers must be careful with respect to the kind of macro-economic policy 
followed because it could hamper development in the long-run. Currently, although it is 
argued that Rwanda is following a pro-poor growth, in actual fact it is implementing the 
neoliberal model which benefits the better-off more. 
• The structural problems that were caused by genocide in 1994 led to the current poverty-
conflict trap. The only way to get out of this trap is by introducing a UIG. 
• Although the Rwanda Revenue Authority is transforming the tax system and raising more 
revenue, a number of problems with regard to the tax system that were identified in 
chapter four need to be addressed. Failure to do this will lead to Rwanda incurring losses 
in tax income, which could be used for investment. If Rwanda is to introduce the UIG, it 
will need a better infrastructure to enable the grant to take off. This is why the researcher 
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is suggesting the introduction of a Ministry in charge of social development so that it is 
able to coordinate the massive resources and also be able to solicit funding from donors. 
• In Rwanda every district has a people’s bank which is good news for the implementation 
of the UIG. However, as Le Roux suggested in his paper to the Taylor commission, 
payment of the UIG requires a financial sector that is digitalised so that HANIS identity 
cards are used. There is a need to improve the banking sector digitally in order to be able 
to accommodate the UIG. 
 
  5.4. Future research areas 
 
This study hopes to make a contribution to social policy and poverty in Rwanda. It should be 
noted that each country can attain economic growth and also get its populations out of poverty as 
long as the revolutionary ideas are country specific. Researchers need to be well informed of the 
dynamics at play and not just be slaves of the ideologies from either the IMF or the World Bank. 
It is the conviction of the researcher that if the UIG is introduced in Rwanda it would facilitate 
the attainment of Vision 2020 together with the MDGs.  The research areas for future research 
are as follows. 
 
• For Rwanda to get its population out of poverty, create jobs and above all be able to 
achieve its Vision 2020 together with the MDGs, it needs to think seriously about 
adopting the UIG as an appropriate social policy that will fill the gap that currently exists 
as the discussion has shown. Although growth is paramount in any economy or country, 
it must have redistributive justice in order for it to translate into economic and social 
development. The researcher proposes future research to be on the impact of UIG on 
economic growth in Rwanda especially now that the country wants to move from a low-
income into a middle-income country.  
 
• In the literature it is argued that the implementation of a UIG requires political will which 
I believe exists in Rwanda except that one has to take it one step at time due to the 
different ideological backgrounds among the policy makers. The researcher proposes 
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future research to be on the role of political will and how it will affect the implementation 
of a UIG in Rwanda.  
 
• The government is promoting public-private partnership as a means to attain growth and 
also get its people out of poverty. The researcher therefore proposes future research to be 
on how the UIG can be funded by funds from big corporations in the form of social 
responsibility towards poverty alleviation. 
 
• Lastly is the contentious issue of what the macro-economic impact of a UIG will be. Will 
it be economic such as a demand stimulus or an impact on savings potential and 
investment or will it change the perceptions of workers, the poor and investors? There is 
indeed reason to do research on this. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Formulas used in the Micro Simulation on Excel. 
 
Average Household per person expenditure ='F: \[Rwandan, decile calculations.xls] Sheet2’!$H2 
Maximum Household per person expenditure ='F: \[Rwandan, decile calculations.xls] Sheet2’! $G2 
Expenditure per capita per month =C8/365 
Daily US $ per person expenditure =D8/U$29 
Monthly US $ per person expenditure at PPP =E8*'F: \[Rwandan, decile calculations.xls] Sheet2’! 
$Q$16 
Monthly US$ per person per month after benefit =F8+ (P8/12/U$29)*'F: \Documents and 
Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Microsoft\Excel\[Rwandan, decile calculations (version 
1).xls]Sheet2'!$R$16 
Percentage increase in per person expenditure = (G8/F8-1) 
Proportion Vatable expenditure =0.1-R4416/1.174+ (R4416+0.2) ^2.1 
Population ='F: \[Rwandan, decile calculations.xls] Sheet2’! $E2/1000000 
Annual Grant ==I$4*12*J8/1000 
Annual Grant per capita =(L8/J8)*1000 
Indirect tax = (C8*I8*J8*$I$3*$K$27)/1000 
Indirect tax per capita = (N8/J8)*1000 
Net Benefit per Household member = (S8/J8)*1000 
Additional VAT and other indirect taxes (Excise tax, Sin tax and levies) = 
(C8*I8*J8*$K$3*$K$27)/1000+ (L8*I8*$L$3*$K$27) 
Per capita additional VAT and other indirect taxes (Excise tax, Sin tax and levies) = (Q8/J8)*1000 
Net Benefit =L8-Q8 
Per capita Net Benefit = (S8/J8)*1000 
Net Benefit =SUM (S8:S16) 
Total Foreign Aid =SUM (T23:T24) 
VAT =M28+M29 
Excise tax =M31+M32 
Total Indirect tax =M27+M30+M33 
Ratio of VAT to Excise + Road Fund +VAT =M34/M27 
 
 
 
 
  
116
Table 25: Appendix B: CALCULATIONS ON A UNIVERSAL INCOME GRANT IN RWANDA (Excel File is available from 
the Author). 
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